過去研究者大都討論李宗仁與蔣介石，或者桂系與蔣的關係，蔣與白崇禧的研究較少。本文選擇戰後蔣介石與白崇禧關係著眼於幾方面的思考：其一，白崇禧在戰後的角色為何？白擔任國防部長期間與蔣的互動為何？其二，戰後蔣、白關係轉捩點為何？李宗仁當選副總統後，白被任命為華中剿匪總司令，與蔣的關係為何？其三，白逼蔣下野的動機？蔣既下野，李推動的和平談判失敗，蔣、李、白各有何計畫？李宗仁最後遠走美國之際，白為何選擇來臺？這些課題都是本文研究的重點。本文將戰後蔣、白的關係分為四個階段：一、合作中有歧見（1945.8- 1948.3）；二、選舉種下恩怨（1948.3-1949.1）；三、逼蔣下野加深宿怨（1949.1- 1949.5）；四、反共一致恩怨難消彌（1949.5-）等進行討論。白崇禧是一位戰略家，戰後提供許多具體的建議，可惜蔣介石都沒有接受，四平街追剿共軍，蔣未接受，成為白一生的憾事，李宗仁當選副總統是蔣、白關係的轉捩點，白被迫辭去國防部長，但仍勉強任華中剿匪總司令，可惜戰略上又與蔣不同調，白一再受挫，仍堅守原則，他是剿共、反共最有決心的將領，一直堅守崗位。中共渡江後，白積極於華中華南一帶備戰，戰事每況愈下，戰略又得不到蔣的支持，一挫再挫，白並沒有像李宗仁一樣選擇逃避，反而更積極尋找反攻的機會，從海南島至臺灣，都還抱持反共的理想，可知他不只是戰略家，也是一位理想主義者。可惜來臺後，白崇禧雖獲聘為戰略顧問，不但未再受重用，且派人監視，這也可以看出蔣用人的偏執。

This paper is divided into four sections, dealing respectively with (1) the disagreeable fellowship between General Pai and President Chiang, (2) their grievance over the election of Vice-president, (3) Chiang's deepening of old grudges caused by forcing him to give up the presidency, and (4) the difficulty in diminishing their resentment even under the mutual unanimous anti-communism.To begin with the first section, despite his appointment by Chiang as the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of China on June 1, 1946, Pai's advice was rarely accepted by him. Failing to use the full force of the troops on hunting down the army of the Communists in the Battle of Siping, for example, was the greatest of regret in Pai's claim as a strategist. Secondly, the fact Pai successfully supported Li Tsung-jen, an important ally in his Guangxi Clique, to participate in the election of vice-presidency, could only but have deepened Chang's grievances against Pai, which brought about his resignation as the Minister of National Defense, though he had to remain grudgingly as the Commander of the armies in Central China in the Hankow region. Due to the opposite attitude towards the Communists, their rift emerged again when Pai defied Chiang's orders by not taking up the initiative to dispatch troops to aid the Battle of Hsupeng. Thirdly, Pai was still actively preparing for war in Central and Southern China after the Communist troops had crossed the Yangtze River on April 21. 1949. Instead of exile like many other high-ranking military officers, Pai faced with the lacking of Chiang's support for his military tactics, had tried to find out any feasible opportunities of counterattack against the Communists as the lighting went from bad to worse. He still steadfastly kept the attitude of anti-communism, even when retreating from Hainan to Taiwan. Unfortunately and fourthly, Chiang out of his bias never placed Pai in an important position since the government reconstructed in Taiwan. There were two main causes for this. Partly because Chiang had felt less trust in local military forces like Pai's since the Northern expedition in 1926 on the other hand, while these varied and many factions also acted haphazardly and half-heartedly in support of Chiang's policy due to their conflicting interests involved on the other, Arguably, and to sum up this discussion, it may be said that Pai's relationship with Chiang during Civil War in China was in fact the very epitome of the relationship between local warlords with the National Government.