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題名：Relative Sensitivity of Performance Measures in Top Executive Compensation Structure
書刊名：管理學報
作者：洪玉舜 引用關係／王泰昌 引用關係
作者(外文)：Hung, Yu-shun／Wang, Taychang
出版日期：2013
卷期：30:3
頁次：頁263-293
主題關鍵詞：高階主管薪酬結構；薪酬績效敏感性；公司特性；產業特性；高階主管特質；CEO compensation structure；Pay-performance-sensitivity；Corporate characteristics；Industry characteristics；CEO characteristics
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(9) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:9
  • 共同引用共同引用:71
  • 點閱點閱:48
本研究探討高階主管薪酬結構比重變化與不同績效衡量指標間之相對敏感性，此為當前極受關注之議題。由於財務績效乃企業決定高階主管薪酬之重要依據，而市場績效亦緊密地與股票薪酬有所關聯，然而各家公司發放薪酬之結構比重有所差異，此亦受到公司面臨之內外環境不同有所影響。是故，本研究主要以高階主管薪酬中佔有較為重大比例之成分，即現金與股票分紅，作為研究之主軸，探討此兩大薪酬成分比重與財務、市場績效指標之相對敏感性，以及與其他非財務性績效指標之敏感性，是否受到高階主管特質、公司與產業特性、以及法規之影響？研究結果指出，首先針對薪酬結構與財務、市場績效之相對敏感性，發現公司成長機會與規模愈大、非家族控股、高科技產業、產業競爭性高、高階主管兼董事，高階主管股票相對於現金薪酬與財務績效敏感性提高，而與市場績效敏感性降低。再者，非財務績效指標，如市場佔有率、產品品質，與高階主管薪酬結構比重之敏感性，亦受到高階主管、公司、產業特性之影響。最後，研究發現2006年薪酬揭露法規修正與2008年員工分紅費用化規定對高階主管薪酬與績效敏感性皆有重大影響。此研究結果期望能提供未來相關研究與實務界作參考，更深入地瞭解企業對高階主管薪酬政策之制訂。
In the wake of a recent slew of high-profile financial scandals, numerous corporations are reexamining compensation policies, and particularly CEO compensation structures. Numerous firms are reducing their reliance on stock options for CEO compensation, in favor of options such as restricted stock, stock awards, and cash bonuses. Examples of such firms include Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, and others. Therefore, this study investigated the determinants of CEO compensation structure, and emphasized the crucial influences on the relationships between CEO compensation structure and corporate performance. First, this work examined whether the relative use of accounting or market performance measures to determine top executive compensation structure is influenced by corporate, CEO, or industry characteristics. The empirical results of this study indicate that CEO compensation structure is influenced most strongly by firm size, followed by accounting performance measures, and next by firm leverage. Additionally, the relative importance of accounting versus market performance measures for CEO compensation structure is influenced by CEO, corporate, and industry characteristics, such as firm growth opportunities and risk, CEO stockholdings, and industry competitiveness. Second, this study provides empirical evidence that the relationship between CEO compensation structure and non-financial performance measures is also influenced by CEO, corporate, and industry characteristics. Finally, this research shows that the 2006 amendment to the Guidelines relating to the disclosure of executive remuneration and the amendment to the Business Accounting Law relating to expensing employee stock bonus from 2008 have had diverse effects on the sensitivity of CEO compensation structure to performance measures.
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