本文主張應該盡早依據聯合國巴黎原則設置一個足以有效發揮巴黎原則理想的國家人權委員會，它應該是一個地位相當於憲法機關的國家機關，獨立於政治部門與政黨關係運作，對於其他憲政機關應該有效發揮保障人權所必須具備的制衡作用。在我國憲政體制的選項中，於總統之下設置國家人權委員會或是於總統及五院之外設置，均須面臨必須修憲的難題。於監察院中設置國家人權委員會，只須修改監察部門的相關組織立法，以定額的監察委員同時擔任國家人權委員會委員(或是於總統提名時即已確定，或是由監察委員分批輪流擔任，何者為宜，可以進一步研究)，借重既有的監察委員職權充實並發揮國家人權委員會的功能，不僅與巴黎原則毫無牴觸衝突，而且應是實現巴黎原則最為有效可行的途逕，值得積極推動，促其實現。

This paper attempts to explore the optimal method to create a national institution of human rights ("NIHR") in Taiwan in accordance with the 1993 UN Paris Principles, via the present constitutional framework. The Control Yuan appears to be the most promising as a potential NIHR. It is an independent government branch established by the separation of powers doctrine of the Constitution, instead of a law promulgated by Congress, which makes it an ideal NIHR because it cannot be abrogated by Congress, and its new role as an NIHR will not require any constitutional amendment. The Control Yuan has all the necessary powers and instruments that an effective NIHR needs, including the powers to investigate, impeach, and correct. Furthermore, it is perfectly positioned to promote human rights education among government agencies after it is reconceived as an NIHR. The structural changes must be done through proper legislation by Congress. Congress can pass a law designating a certain percentage, say, 50%, of Control Yuan members to concurrently serve as NIHR commission members. Another relevant measure is that the President will have to nominate qualified Control Yuan/NIHR member candidates for Congress's approval.