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題名:財富分配ˎ社會階層結構和經濟績效--一個政治經濟學模型
書刊名:經濟論文叢刊
作者:李太龍潘士遠
作者(外文):Li, TailongPan, Shiyuan
出版日期:2014
卷期:42:3
頁次:頁405-451
主題關鍵詞:財富分配政治投資階層結構經濟績效Wealth distributionPolitical investmentSocial structureEconomic performance
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
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  • 點閱點閱:21
本文採用政治經濟學視角討論為什麼財富分配不均導致經濟績效不良。如果初始財富分配很不均或政治投資成本很高或信貸市場很不完善,那麼可以進行政治投資的個體就少,政治市場的競爭就微弱。這樣,在位的政治精英就能制定經濟政策剝削其他階級(中產階級),這不僅加劇財富分配不均而且導致經濟扭曲嚴重,損害經濟發展。模型表明,(在一定條件下)財富分配格局、社會階層結構和經濟績效長期演進到穩態,該穩態取決於初始財富分配、政治投資成本和信貸市場完善程度。
Why will an unequal wealth distribution lead to poor economic performance? This paper develops a simple model to answer this question from the perspective of political economics. It is shown that, under some conditions, the distribution of wealth, social structure and economic performance emerge as long-run steady equilibrium outcomes depending on the initial wealth distribution, the political investment cost and the credit market’s imperfection. The more unequal the initial wealth distribution or the higher the political investment cost or the greater the degree of imperfection in the credit market, the less the individuals are able to invest in political capital. Therefore, the political market is less competitive and the incumbent political elite can levy a high tax on the middle class. This not only worsens wealth inequality but also undermines economic development.
期刊論文
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8.劉海峰(2000)。科舉制的起源與進士科的起始。歷史研究,2000(6),3-16+190。  延伸查詢new window
9.謝俊美(2001)。晚清賣官鬻爵新探--兼論捐納制度與清朝滅亡。華東師範大學學報(哲學社會科學版),33,50-61。  延伸查詢new window
10.顧善慕(2006)。清代乾隆年間的捐納制度。黑龍江社會科學,5,158-159。  延伸查詢new window
11.Daron Acemoglu(2006)。A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions, Scan- dinavian。Journal of Economics,108,515-546。  new window
12.Aghion, Philippe、Eve Caroli、Cecilia García-Peñalosa(1999)。Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories。Journal of Economic Literature,37,1615-1660。  new window
13.Ansolabehere, Stephen、de Figueiredo John M.、Snyder James M. Jr.(2003)。Why Is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics。Journal of Economic Perspectives,17,105-130。  new window
14.Banerjee, Abhijit V.、Duflo, Esther(2003)。Inequality and Growth: What can the Data Say?。Journal of Economic Growth,8,267-299。  new window
15.Benhabib, Jess、Aldo Rustichini(1996)。Social Conflict and Growth。Journal of Economic Growth,1,125-142。  new window
16.Bennedsen, Morten、Feldmann Sven E.(2006)。Informational Lobbying and Political Contributions。Journal of Public Economics,90,631-656。  new window
17.Connolly, William J.(1996)。How Low Can You Go? State Campaign Contribution Limits and the First Amendment。Boston University Law Review,76,483-536。  new window
18.Li, Hongyi、Zou, Heng-fu(1998)。Income Inequality is not Harmful for Growth: Theory and Evidence。Review of Development Economics,2(3),318-334。  new window
19.Pedersen, Karl R.(1995)。Rent-seeking, Political Influence and Inequality: A Simple Analytical Example。Public Choice,82,281-305。  new window
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21.Forbes, K. J.(2000)。A Reassessment of the Relationship between Inequality and Growth。The American Economic Review,90(4),869-887。  new window
22.Faccio, Mara(2006)。Politically-Connected Firms: Can They Squeeze the State?。American Economic Review,96(1),369-386。  new window
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學位論文
1.唐焱(2008)。法律視野下的徽州鹽商--從萬曆至道光(碩士論文)。華東政法大學,上海。  延伸查詢new window
2.夏衛東(2006)。清代科舉制度的若干問題研究(博士論文)。浙江大學,杭州。  延伸查詢new window
圖書
1.白壽彞(1999)。中國通史第九卷(中古時代.明時期)。上海:上海人民出版社。  延伸查詢new window
2.寺田隆信、張正明(1986)。山西商人研究。山西人民出版社。  延伸查詢new window
3.Chen, Zhao、Lu Ming、He Junzhi(2008)。Political Participation of Entrepreneurs: Evidence from Liu-zhou, Guangxi, Chian。Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy。  new window
其他
1.晶報(20130616)。從科員到省部級--中國官員升遷圖。  延伸查詢new window
2.雷宇,王磊(20100108)。行賄當上的人大代表風光依舊。  延伸查詢new window
3.雷宇,王磊(20100131)。商人進政協不能只看賺錢多少。  延伸查詢new window
圖書論文
1.Be´nabou, Roland J.(2005)。Inequality, Technology, and the Social Contract。Handbook of Economic Growth。Amsterdam:North-Holland Press。  new window
 
 
 
 
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