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題名:Inside Debt and Corporate Financing Decisions
書刊名:財務金融學刊
作者:李艷榕 引用關係沈信漢 引用關係
作者(外文):Lee, Yen-jungShen, Carl Hsin-han
出版日期:2016
卷期:24:2
頁次:頁1-23
主題關鍵詞:經理人薪酬債型薪酬融資決策財務槓桿Executive compensationInside debtFinancing decisionLeverage
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(1) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:1
  • 共同引用共同引用:7
  • 點閱點閱:112
我們發現經理人債型薪酬與財務槓桿之間的負向關係是因變數定義方式所導致。為避免此 問題,本文檢驗公司融資決策並發現當公司面臨融資需求(擁有剩餘資金)時,有較高債型薪 酬的公司會增加(減少)公司債務,且此傾向只在公司財務槓桿偏低時存在。因此債型薪酬確 實提供經理人誘因使用低成本債務融資,不會導致過高財務槓桿。
We find that the negative association between firm leverage and inside debt documented by prior research is driven by a mechanical association between these two variables. To circumvent this problem, we focus on the firm’s marginal financing decisions. We show that firms with higher CEO inside debt tend to issue more (retire less) debt when facing financing deficits (surpluses). This tendency is pronounced only when the firm is under-leveraged, but not when it is over-leveraged, suggesting that CEO inside debt allows firms to take advantage of the lower cost of financing, but does not lead to excessive debt.
期刊論文
1.Bebchuk, L. A.、Jackson, R. J.(2005)。Executive pensions。Journal of Corporation Law,30,823-855。  new window
2.Edmans, A.、Liu, Q.(2011)。Inside debt。Review of Finance,15(1),75-102。  new window
3.Sundaram, R. K.、Yermack, D. L.(2007)。Pay me later: Inside debt and its role in managerial compensation。The Journal of Finance,62(4),1551-1588。  new window
4.Wei, C.、Yermack, D. L.(2011)。Investor reactions to CEOs' inside debt incentives。The Review of Financial Studies,24(11),3813-3840。  new window
5.Anantharaman, D.、Fang, V. W.、Gong, G.(2014)。Inside Debt and the Design of Corporate Debt Contracts。Management Science,60(5),1260-1280。  new window
6.Cassell, C. A.、Huang, S. X.、Sanchez, J. M.、Stuart, M. D.(2012)。Seeking Safety: The Relation between CEO Inside Debt Holding and the Riskiness of Firm Investment and Financial Policies。Journal of Financial Economics,103(3),588-610。  new window
7.Bebchuk, Lucian A.、Fried, Jesse M.(2004)。Stealth compensation via retirement benefits。Berkeley Business Law Journal,1,291-326。  new window
8.Dong, Zhiyong、Wang, Cong B.、Xie, Fei(2010)。Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking?。Journal of Banking and Finance,34(10),2518-2529。  new window
9.Phan, Hieu V.(2014)。Inside debt and mergers and acquisitions。Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,49,1365-1401。  new window
10.鄧家珍、劉維琪(20111200)。CEO Overconfidence and Pecking Order Prediction--Evidence from Taiwanese Electronics Companies。財務金融學刊,19(4),89-118。new window  new window
11.Wang, Yung-Jang、Gu, Yi-Fang(2003)。The choice of capital structure, the scale of financing and debt refunding。Journal of Financial Studies,11(3),35-87。  new window
12.Black, Fischer、Scholes, Myron S.(1973)。The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities。Journal of Political Economy,81(3),637-654。  new window
13.Fama, Eugene F.、French, Kenneth R.(1997)。Industry Costs of Equity。Journal of Financial Economics,43(2),153-193。  new window
14.Frank, Murray Z.、Goyal, Vidhan K.(2003)。Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure。Journal of Financial Economics,67(2),217-248。  new window
15.Flannery, Mark J.、Rangan, Kasturi P.(2006)。Partial Adjustment toward Target Capital Structures。Journal of Financial Economics,79(3),469-506。  new window
16.Shyam-Sunder, Lakshmi、Myers, Stewart C.(1999)。Testing Static Tradeoff against Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure。Journal of Financial Economics,51(2),219-244。  new window
17.Jensen, Michael C.、Meckling, William H.(1976)。Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure。Journal of Financial Economics,3(4),305-360。  new window
 
 
 
 
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