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來源文獻資料
外文摘要
引文資料
題名:
認知的證成與可靠理論
書刊名:
歐美研究
作者:
黃懿梅
作者(外文):
Huang, Yih Mei
出版日期:
1992
卷期:
22:2
頁次:
頁77-105
主題關鍵詞:
認知
;
信念
;
證成
;
知識
;
可靠理論
原始連結:
連回原系統網址
相關次數:
被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
排除自我引用:0
共同引用:0
點閱:21
This paper is concerned with reliabilism as a theory of justified belief. According to Goldman, a person S rationally believes a proposition P if and only if his belief is caused by a reliable cognitive process. It is a reliable process theory. (RP) Likewise, Swain claims that S rationally believes P on the basis of reason R if and only if S's believing that P on the basis of indication theory. (RI) In this paper, I have discussed some problems of reliabilism, especially the problem of whether RP is inconsistent with RI or not. I have argued that reliabilists have not solved all of these problems: 1.Reliability is not a sufficient condition for a justified belief. It is not necessary for justifiedness. I have argued that several proposals are unsatisfactory. 2.Reliabilism encounters "the problem of generality." Reliabilists fail to give any account of the type of relevant processes or the relevant characteristics that are broad enough to avoid "the single case problem" but not so broad as to encounter "the no-distinction problem." I have argued, in particular, that reliabilists do not provide an acceptable solution to the no-distinction problem. 3.Reliabilism is an externalism. It cannot avoid the difficulties of externalism. 4.As for whether RP is inconsistent with RI or not, I have argued that reliable processes may be one of the cognizer's relevant characteristics C. So conceived, RP is consistent with RI. The problem is how to provide an account of the relevant characteristics.
以文找文
期刊論文
1.
Duran, J.(1988)。Reliabilism, Foundationalism, and Naturalized Epistemic Justification Theory。Metaphilosophy,19,113-127。
2.
Bach, K.(1985)。A Rationale for Reliabilism。The Monist,68,246-263。
3.
Audi, R.(1988)。Justification, Truth, and Reliability。Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,49,1-29。
4.
Gleb, G.(1990)。The Trouble with Goldman's Reliabilism。Austral asian Journal of Philosophy,68,382-394。
5.
Ginet, C.(1985)。Contra Reliabilism。The Monist,68,175-189。
6.
Foley, R.(1985)。What's Wrong with Reliabilism?。The Monist,68,188-202。
7.
Feldman, R.(1985)。Reliability and Justification。The Monist,68,159-174。
8.
Kapitan, T.(1985)。Reliability and Indirect Justification。The Monist,68,277-287。
9.
Goldman, A. I.(1976)。Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge。The Journal of Philosophy,73,771-791。
10.
Schmitt, F. F.(1981)。Justification as Reliable Indication or Reliable Process?。Philosophical Studies,40,409-417。
11.
Plantinga, A.(1990)。Justification in the 20th Century。Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,50,45-71。
12.
Luper-Foy, S.(1985)。The Reliabilist Theory of Rational Belief。The Monist,68,203-225。
13.
Swain, M.(1985)。Justification, Reasons, and Reliability。Synthese,64,69-92。
14.
Swain, M.(1981)。Justification and Reliable Belief。Philosophical Studies,40,389-407。
15.
Shatz, D.(1981)。Reliability and Relevant Alternatives。Philosophical Studies,39,393-408。
16.
Schmitt, F. F.(1983)。Knowledge, Justification and Reliability。Synthese,55,209-229。
圖書
1.
Bonjour, L.(1985)。The Structure of Empirical Knowledge。Cambridge:Harvard University Press。
2.
Armstrong, D. M.(1973)。Belief, Truth and Knowledge。Cambridge University Press。
3.
French, Peter、Uehling, T. E.、Wettstein, H. K.(1980)。Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Vol. 5: Studies in Epistemology。Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press。
4.
Goldman, A. I.(1986)。Epistemology and Cognition。Cambridge:Harvard University Press。
5.
Pollock, J. L.(1986)。Contemporary Theories of Knowledge。Totowa, N. J.:Rowman & Littlefield。
6.
Pappas, G. S.(1979)。Justification and Knowledge。Dordrecht:D. Reidel Publishing Company。
圖書論文
1.
Goldman, Alvin I.(1979)。What Is Justified Belief?。Justification and Knowledge。Dordrecht:D. Reidel Publishing Company。
2.
Goldman, A. I.(1978)。A Causal Theory of Knowing。Essays on Knowledge and Justification。Ithaca:Cornell University Press。
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