本文為關於早期美國新左派與美國民主傳統之間關係的一系列論文之第五篇。本篇所討論者全為「學生民主會」在美國北方初期的新左派運動。相對於第四篇所討論之「學生非暴力協調委員會」在美國南方的新左派運動，前者既淵源於後者，又平行支援後者。 「學生民主會」初期的新左派運動，非如其預期一樣發生在學界內部，而是追隨「學生非暴力協調委員會」之腳步，發生在學界以外之社會中。正如本文第一部份所指，剛開始時，這雖是出自學生領袖們自己的意見。但後來主要還是因為他們對黑人在南方推動極端傑佛遜民權／新左派運動所表現的“新叛亂”有所了解所致。又如本文第二部份所示，此種了解加上其他次要因素，直接產生了該會第一項，最大規模及最重要方案，即「經濟研究與行動方案」--以下簡稱「經研行案」。該部份所討論的重點為「學生民主會」在北方城市組織窮人及失業者的跨種族運動之觀念。此種觀念起源於該會在蔡士特分會於一九六三年秋季自動及獨立組織窮人的成功經驗，並經該會領袖精心思索以使「經研行案」在最初三個月運作走樣後得以重生。 本文第三部份將「學生民主會」之「經研行案」視為其挑戰北方非傑佛遜式民主之傑佛遜／極端傑佛遜式參與民主之試驗而加以分析。分析之目的在於發現：旨在實現作為跨種族窮人運動之「經研行案」之基本目的而於一九六四年夏季推行之十方案之共同模式。那些模式是靠兩種相同的比較而發現：其一是比較：「經研行案」之傑佛遜式運作和詹森總統的「對貧窮宣戰」之假傑佛遜式實踐，另的是比較「經研行案」之內部之極端傑佛遜式「現在獲得工作或收入」案和傑佛遜式「現在就清除垃圾或得到收入」案。「經研行案」內部在經過兩案支持者之間辯論後，「現在就清除垃圾或得到收入」案獲勝。雖然該年夏季見到不少傑佛遜式的成就，但這畢竟不是極端傑佛遜式「經研行案」所欲達到的目的：跨種族的窮人運動終未見實現。 不過「經研行案」在一九六五年夏季之實踐則是極端傑佛遜孫式，因受到「學生非暴力協調委員會」之影響，它在實踐參與性民主之名義下，廢除了全國性總部及全國性的領袖，所剩下的各個別方案在沒有中央指導或任何協助下各自為政。在無統一組織狀態之下，一切全隨個別組織者自己喜好而定，不負責的說變就變、個別方案之孤立也導至「經研行案」早期所信守傑佛遜式實用性組織實踐之漸被拋棄。各個別方案在孤立中發展出過份跨張之自主意識。末期「經研行案」之極端傑佛遜式實踐，最後證明為完全的失敗實不足為奇。本文晚後部份除指出極端傑佛遜式「經研行案」之各種失敗癥兆外，並進而探討注定其失敗命運之各種因素。發現其中最重要是其內部對參與性民主之極端傑佛遜式詮釋及實踐。

This is the fifth of my series of essays on the relationship between the early American New Left and American tradition of democracy. It is devoted to SDS’s initial New Left movement in the North which derived from, paralleled and supported that of SNCC in the South. Following SNCC’s steps, SDS’s initial New Left movement took place in the real world, not in the academic world SDS originally expected. This, as pointed out in the first part of this essay, was due primitively to the ideas of SDS leaders themselves, but chiefly to SDS’s understanding of the ultra-Jeffersonian “new insurgency”—the ultra-Jeffersonian civil-right/New Left movement by Negroes in the South as well as in the North. That understanding combined with other secondary factors, as indicated in the second part of this essay, led directly to SDS’s first, largest and most important project, ERAP. But the emphasis of that part is on SDS’s ultra-Jeffersonian idea of organizing an interracial movement of the poor and the unemployed in Northern cities, and idea which originated in the successful organizing experience in Chester where the local SDS chapter spontaneously and independently organized the poor in the fall of 1963, and which some SDS leaders elaborated for the purpose of revivifying the ERAP which had not worked out at all the way it was supposed to during the first three months. SDS’s ERAP is analyzed, in the third part of this essay, as its attempt to test participatory democracy—it Jeffersonian/ultra-Jeffersonian challenge to non-Jeffersonian democracy in the North. The purpose of the analysis in that part in to find out the common patterns of the ten projects of ERAP in the summer of 1964, which were designed to implement the basic goal of ERAP as an interracial movement of the poor. Those patterns are discerned by means of two different kinds of comparison: one is between the Jeffersonian operation of ERAP and the pseudo-Jeffersonian practice of President Johnson’s “War on Poverty”; the other between the ultra-Jeffersonian JOIN and the Jeffersonian GROIN within ERAP. After winning the “JOIN v. GROIN” debate among ERAPers, the Jeffersonian GROIN became ERAP’s unanimous approach. Though it had made considerable strides over the summer, those Jeffersonian achievements were not what ultra-Jeffersonian ERAP had set out grandiosely to do; the interracial movement of the poor never emerged. The ERAP in the summer of 1965 was, however, ultra-Jeffersonian in practice. Influenced by SNCC, it had abandoned its national headquarters and abolished its national leaders in the name of participator democracy. Individual projects went off without central direction or assistance of any kind. In the absence of such an organizational content they changed as quickly and as irresponsibly as the whims of the individual organizers themselves. The isolation of individual organizing projects also led to the erosion of ERAP’s earlier Jeffersonian commitment to experimental and pragmatic organizing. In isolation, ach project came to develop an exaggerated sense of its own importance. It was not surprising that this late ultra-Jeffersonian ERAP turned out to be a complete failure. In addition to indicating symptoms of the failure of the ultra-Jeffersonian ERAP such as these, the last part of this essay also inquires into the various causes of its doomed failure, among which the most important was the ultra-Jeffersonian interpretation and performance of participatory democracy within ERAP.