:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
題名:財務困難公司之盈餘管理實證研究
書刊名:管理學報
作者:林嬋娟 引用關係洪櫻芬薛敏正 引用關係
作者(外文):Lin, Chan-janeHung, Ying-fenShiue, Min-jeng
出版日期:1997
卷期:14:1
頁次:頁15-38
主題關鍵詞:盈餘管理財務困難全額交割股應計項目Earnings managementFinancial distressFull-delivery stockAccruals
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(37) 博士論文(4) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:37
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:182
     本研究旨在( 1 )分析國內歷年來艱困公司之特性及其發生財務困難之原委; ( 2 )探討經理人員於公司瀕臨財務困難之際,是否會企圖操縱盈餘, 以避免遭變更交易 之處分。本研究假說推測,經理人員在工作保全、或減少董事會、管制機構介入,或避免( 遞延)違約成本之誘因下,將可能在公司發生財務危機時,企圖美化帳面盈餘。 本研究樣本共有二組:財務困難公司與正常公司。前者係指民國 65 年至 83 年間,因財 務困難而改採全額交割方式進行交易之上市公司;後者則為與財務困難公司行業別相同,全 額交割年度資產總額最相近之第一或第二類股的上市公司。 本研究實證結果顯示,財務困難公司發生變更交易的比率,以紡織業為最高,約為 33.3%; 以民國 74 年最為頻繁,約佔 33.3%; 而約 70% 之財務困難公司已具有 15 年以上之歷史 ;超過一半的樣本公司於上市五年內,發生財務困難。此外,在盈餘操縱分析方面,本研究 發現公司因財務狀況惡化,而有變更交易之虞時,經理人員會利用裁決性應收帳款及存貨操 縱盈餘,以掩飾公司財務困境之真相。故本研究之實證結果顯示經理人員會利用操縱盈餘行 為,使盈餘增加以免遭變更交易之厄運。
     The purpose of this study is to (1) analyze the characteristics of fina- ncially distressed compaines and reasons causing finacial distress;(2)examine whether or not mangers manipulate earnings in the face of financial distress. This paper hypothesizes that managers of the compaines with persistent earning problems have incentives to increase reported earning in attempts to keep their jobs, reduce intervention by the board of directors or regulatory agencies and avoid default of the contracts. Research sample in this study is separated into two groups:distressed companies and nondistressed compaines. The former group contains full-delivery stocks listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange between 1976 and 1994, the latter group consists matched firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange, using industry and firm size as matching criteria. The empirical results indicate that textile industry accounts for the highest percentage (33.3%) of distressed compaines, and about one-third of sample distressed firms became full delivery stocks in 1985.Further, around 70% of distressed companies have been founded for more than 15 years. Interestingly, this study finds that more than half of the distressed firms are listed in the Exchange for no more than five years. Overall, the results show that distressed companies have more income increasing actions than non-distressed firms. In particular, it is found that manipulation firms tend to emply accounts receivable and inventory as income increasing mainipulation tools.
期刊論文
1.Zmijewski, M. E.、Hagerman, R. L.(1981)。An Income Strategy Approach to the Positive Theory of Accounting Standard Setting Choice。Journal of Accounting and Economics,3(2),129-149。  new window
2.Bartov, Eli F.(1993)。The Timing of Asset Sales and Earnings Manipulation。The Accounting Review,68(4),840-855。  new window
3.Hand, J. R. M.(1989)。Did Firms Undertake Debt-Equity Swaps for An Accounting Paper Profit or True Financial Gain?。The Accounting Review,64(4),587-623。  new window
4.DeAngelo, L. E.(1988)。Managerial Competition, Information Costs, and Corporate Governance: The Use of Accounting Performance Measures in Proxy Contest。Journal of Accounting and Economics,10(1),3-36。  new window
5.Dhaliwal, G.、Salamon, L.、Smith, E. D.(1990)。The Effect of Owner Versus Management Control on the Choice of Accounting Methods。Journal of Accounting and Economics,1990(Jan.),45-63。  new window
6.Jones, J. J.(1991)。Earning Management During Import Relief Investigations。Journal of Accounting Research,29(2),193-228。  new window
7.Gilson, Stuart C.(1989)。Management Turnover and Financial Distress。Journal of Financial Economics,25(2),241-262。  new window
8.Moses, O. D.(1987)。Income Smoothing and Incentives: Empirical Tests Using Accounting Changes。Accounting Review,62(2),358-377。  new window
9.Aharony, Joseph、Lin, Chan Jane、Loeb, Martin P.(1993)。Initial Public Offerings, Accounting Choices, and Earnings Management。Contemporary Accounting Research,10(1),61-81。  new window
10.Dechow, Patricia M.、Sloan, Richard G.、Sweeney, Amy P.(1995)。Detecting earnings management。The Accounting Review,70(2),193-225。  new window
11.Healy, Paul M.(1985)。The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions。Journal of Accounting and Economics,7(1-3),85-107。  new window
12.DeAngelo, Linda E.(1986)。Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes: A study of management buyouts of public stockholders。The Accounting Review,61(3),400-420。  new window
13.Weisbach, Michael S.(1988)。Outside directors and CEO turnover。Journal of Financial Economics,20(1/2),431-460。  new window
14.DeAngelo, Harry、Skinner, Douglas J.、DeAngelo, Linda E.(1994)。Accounting choice in troubled companies。Journal of Accounting and Economics,17(1/2),113-143。  new window
15.DeFond, Mark L.、Jiambalvo, James(1994)。Debt Covenant Violation and Manipulation of Accruals。Journal of Accounting and Economics,17(1/2),145-176。  new window
研究報告
1.Bannister, J. W.、Newman, H. A.(1992)。Management forecasts as targets for earnings management。Chicago:University of Illinois。  new window
學位論文
1.官心怡(1994)。經理人員盈餘預測與盈餘操縱之關聯性(碩士論文)。國立臺灣大學,臺北市。  延伸查詢new window
2.賴耀群(1977)。銀行放款信用評估模式之研究(碩士論文)。淡江大學。  延伸查詢new window
3.管夢欣(1993)。長期性資產出售交易與盈餘操縱行為之關聯性實證研究(碩士論文)。國立臺灣大學。  延伸查詢new window
4.何太山(1977)。運用區別分析建立商業放款信用評分制度(碩士論文)。國立政治大學。  延伸查詢new window
5.劉建和(1992)。財務危機診斷的理論探討與實證研究(碩士論文)。國立臺灣大學。  延伸查詢new window
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
:::
QR Code
QRCODE