非營利組織(Non-profit organizations, NPOs)顧名思義即非強調獲利性，而不 從事營利性企業活動。然而，NPOs的支持率日趨下降。在缺乏營利活動的支援下，NPOs的 可用資金來源已逐漸減少，若NPOs本身無法自闢財源，勢必無法順利達成其組織目標。而 非營利組織透過基金管理追求獲利的機會，可以幫助非營利組織開闢財源、達成其組織目 標。 　　本研究首先強調非營利基金會基金績效上的衡量。在基金績效的衡量上，採用基金運 用的報酬率及風險性資產的投資比例來衡量基金會基金績效管理的效率性。所以，衡量上 將兼顧投資報酬與投資風險。另外，也從代理問題(agency problem)及就業市場機能(labor market mechanism)的角度探討影響基金會基金績效管理的原因。 　　研究結果發現，聘雇專業投資人及非營利基金會之投資動機為影響基金會投資報酬的 重要因素。當基金會認知到其可資運用之資金愈來愈缺乏時，所形成強烈的投資動機，將 對資金運用的報酬率有顯著的影響。但是，員工離職率及捐贈補助比率則不影響基金運用 之報酬。也就是說基金會的員工在工作上有相當的保障，因此不必進行風險性的投資來增 加本身工作的風險性。另外，不論資金的來源是基金會努力賺得或無償受贈，在資金的運 用上並沒有差別。這隱含著基金會的投資操作有正確的機會成本的概念。

　　　　　It's obvious that the non-profit organizations(NPOs) should not focus on profit-making business. However, the outside funding source for NPOs has been declining dramativally over time. In this case, if NPOs cannot obtain other source for funding, they won't be able to accomplish their organizational goals. Under this kind of scenario, NPOs should earn profit through fund management to support their own organizations. 　　In this paper, we focus on the measurement of fund performance of non-profit foundations. We measure the fund performance based on the realized returns of fund investments and the proportion of fund invested in risky assets. Hence, the return and the risk are the criteria for fund performance measurement. Moreover, we try to explore the factors that affect the fund performance of the foundations based on the agency theory and the labor market mechanism. 　　We find that the major factor affecting the returns of fund investments is the employment of professional agents. A foundation employing professional agents for the management of fund experiences higher investment returns. Further, the motives for investments influence the fund performance also. If the foundation is lack of capital, it pays more attention to the fund investments and experiences higer performance. Nevertheless, the fund performance is not significantly related to the laying off in the labor market and the prportion of free capital such as donation from the government. Without the labor market mechanism, the employees tend to less risky investments for the sake of job entrenchment. Finally, we also show that the size but not the source of funds matters for fund performance.