本文以地方國有上市公司為樣本,研究薪酬契約簽約方身份對會計信息契約作用的影響。研究發現,地方國有上市公司的管理者薪酬與會計業績具有顯著的正相關關系。并且,相對于控股股東委托董事會與總經理簽約,當控股股東直接與董事長簽約時,薪酬契約對會計信息的需求更大,會計信息的契約作用更強。進一步地,相對于企業性質的控股股東與董事長簽約,行政性質的控股股東與董事長簽約下薪酬契約對會計信息的需求更大,會計信息的契約作用更強。本文的結論表明,我國地方國有上市公司的薪酬契約是有效的,而簽約方身份的不同會影響薪酬契約對會計信息的需求。

This paper investigates how different nature of contracting parties affect contracting role of accounting information in compensation contracts of China’s local state-owned enterprises( SOEs). This paper finds that relation between pay and performance in compensation contracts of local SOEs are significantly positive. When compared with the contracts signed by board and CEO,the contracting role of accounting information is stronger in contracts signed by controlling shareholder and chair of the board. Further,the demand for accounting information in compensation contracts is even higher when the controlling shareholder is government. This paper points out different nature of contracting parties indeed affect contracting role of accounting information in compensation contracts.