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題名：購併財務行為決策模式：台灣金融控股公司之實證研究
作者：李宏達
作者(外文)：Hung-Ta Lee
校院名稱：國立臺北大學
系所名稱：企業管理學系
指導教授：林泉源
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2007
主題關鍵詞：金控公司；行為財務；購併績效；購併動機；類神經網路；artificial neural network；behavioral finance；financial holding corporation；incentives of merge and acquisition；performances of merge and acquisition
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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本研究主要目的在探討台灣14家金控公司購併相關議題。雖然業者認為購併可擴大規模及市佔率，節省成本並提高效率，但文獻對於購併後績效是否改善，結論相當紛歧，且指出購併動機包括股東價值極大化及非極大化二者，無法達成一致結論。是以本研究首先衡量樣本公司在購併後之績效改善情形，同時探討其動機，並以行為財務理論加以解釋，最後則嘗試建立行為決策模式。
針對上述議題，本研究首先以因素分析法就1997～2006年間各金控公司及其子公司之27項共同性及獨特性財務指標萃取因素；並以其為解釋變數，Tobin Q為績效衡量指標，進行複迴歸分析，以確認該因素是否具有顯著解釋能力。結果發現，獲利能力為正向顯著，但經營績效則為負向顯著，原因為催收款比率改變迴歸方向。而檢定金控公司成立後各年績效發現，母子公司獲利能力多逐漸轉佳；但金控母公司及銀行子公司營運績效顯著轉差，保險子公司顯著轉佳，而證券子公司則無顯著改變。其次，再以T檢定驗證金控公司成立前後各子公司績效變化，結果發現各子公司在加入金控後之經營績效並未顯著好轉。而為確認上述結果，本研究以類神經網路之倒傳遞方法進行強健性分析，其預測結果可支持該結論。最後再針對購併動機進行質化分析，結果發現，獲利結構、市場競爭力及市場籌資等三項可極大化股東價值之假說，均未發現足夠證據支持購併可極大化股東價值。但聯結稅制則提供租稅減免誘因，使金控公司競爭力更強，而可持續購併。此外，本研究發現，主併公司決策者因傲慢而支付較高溢價；因樂觀及過度自信而高估成功機率；董監事及經理人更可在購併過程中獲取個人利益，尤以持股比例偏低者最為明顯，但其利益增加係以股東權益減少為代價；同時，董監事及經理人因持續進行購併，而可管理規模更大公司，藉以擴增權力基礎，雖然員工人數、營業費用及薪資費用持續成長，但營業收入及稅前盈餘並未隨之增加，顯示決策者經由購併以擴大權力之際，績效並未同時顯著成長。因而本研究結果可大致支持股東權益非極大化之動機。
經由上述實證結果，本研究提出購併財務行為決策模式。在進行購併時，各項績效之預期係用於合理化動機，而動機則受心理及政策因素影響，且因金融業受高度管制，故購併可能形成風潮，此時資本市場將高度關注並期待，故動機可能被忽略，而僅強調績效。但在購併後，若績效符合預期，則購併將持續進行；若不符合預期，則因規模已經擴大，致資本市場監控力量薄弱，決策者仍可持續進行購併。
This paper investigates the performances and motivations on merge and acquisition (M&A) activities for 14 financial holding corporations (FHCs) of Taiwan. Although the decision makers announce that, M&A can help acquirer increase size and market share, there also exist various different opinions on literatures that M&A may or may not create synergies. On the other hand, there are literatures illustrating that, different motivations would induce different behaviors and performances on M&A. Therefore, this paper measures the performances after FHCs establishment first, to verify whether FHCs perform better or not. Secondary, identifies the motivations on M&A, and explains it by behavioral financial theory. Finally, tries to establish a behavioral oriented financial model to integrate the motivations, performances, and policies, which operate on financial markets simultaneously.
For empirical studies, this paper selects 27 quarterly financial indexes of FHCs and subsidiaries of banking, insurance, and securities firms during 1997-2006, applies the factor analysis techniques to decrease the data loading and extract the factors. Secondly, defines the factors as independent variables and the computed Tobin Q as dependent variables to run 4 multi-regression models, to ensure whether the factors can explain the performances or not. As a result, the profitability is positively and the operation is negative statistically significant, indicating the non-performing loans (NPL) ratio would change the direction of regression equations. Thereafter, this paper distinguishes the performances among FHCs and their subsidiaries after established via T-test, which find the profitability of both FHCs and subsidiaries perform better year by year, but the operating performance of FHCs and banks are getting worse, insurance subsidiaries perform better significantly, and securities firms perform the same as before. Also, this paper tests the differences of performances during prior and posterior 5 years of FHCs establishment, which find no evidences for better performances after FHCs operated. In order to verify the conclusions described above, this paper suggests the backpropagation method of artificial neural network as robustness to test, and the results can support the same conclusions.
In order to clarify the motivations of M&A, this paper introduces the qualitative methods to analyze. For equity maximum hypothesis, there exist no strong evidences to support the diversification of profit structure, the strength of competitiveness, and the efficiency of capital raising, but the linkage taxation system provide an attractive reason for FHCs to merge continuously. For equity non-maximum hypothesis, this paper finds FHCs pay premiums for acquired firms and support the hubris hypothesis exists, and the existing optimism phenomenon encourage managers to invest on the projects that net present value lower than zero. However, M&A can increase the benefits of directors and managers, especially on the lower shareholding percentages cases, but the benefits of shareholders are decreasing simultaneously. Because of M&A activities can broaden the size of corporations quickly, managers would extend their managerial power meanwhile, although the numbers of employees, salaries, and operating expenses increase after M&A, but the sales and earnings are not increase to the same extent, indicating the performances are not better than before, which support the hypothesis that M&A can not increase the performances of acquiring FHCs.
Finally, this paper proposes a behavioral oriented financial model, identifies both the psychological factors and governmental policies would influence the motivations on M&A, and the performances improvement would be the reason that decision makers seeking financial market to support M&A. However, if FHCs perform better after M&A, the activities would operate continuously. On the other hand, because of the firm size broadened after M&A, the supervisory power of capital markets would become weaker relatively, to push the M&A operate continuously even the performances are not better than before.
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