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題名：管理授權、專利授權與策略性貿易政策－賽局理論之應用
作者：陳佩鈴
作者(外文)：Pei-Ling, Chen
校院名稱：國立臺北大學
系所名稱：經濟學系
指導教授：謝修
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2009
主題關鍵詞：管理授權；專利授權；策略性貿易政策；Delegation；Patent Licensing；Strategic Trade Policy
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本論文是由三篇既獨立且相關的文章所構成。首先，論文的第二章延伸 Bernhofen (1997) 所分析的問題，我們將兩出口國的廠商家數一般化，獨占要素供應商分別對兩個下游國家採取單一定價與差別取價，探討不同的要素訂價模式如何影響出口國的貿易政策。我們要探究的問題是：給定獨占要素供應商對中間財不同訂價策略下，兩下游出口國各自擁有不同廠商家數時，兩國政府的最適出口政策為何 ? 我們的結論得到，上游要素市場的存在會降低或甚而改變下游政府對出口品的補貼誘因；另一方面，下游兩國廠商面對同一要素市場，貿易政策對中間財價格的影響，可能產生外部效果，間接使對手廠商受惠或受傷害，因此，下游的廠商家數對其政府貿易政策的影響就形成重要的關鍵因素。
論文的第三章則沿襲第二章垂直相關產業的模型架構，對於下游出口廠商，我們導入 Miller and Pazgal (2005) 相對績效下的管理授權，重新檢視管理授權對於垂直相關產業貿易政策上的影響。Miller and Pazgal (2005) 將相對績效之管理授權應用至國際市場中，獲得新的發現與洞見。由於他們的分析僅考慮最終財市場，因此，本章將其概念延伸至上、下游垂直相關市場，既可探討中間財市場的存在對其管理授權的影響，亦可分析不同的要素訂價模式如何影響出口貿易政策。我們的研究發現，管理授權對於國際市場上存在上、下游相關產業，在策略性貿易理論上扮演著決定性的角色。當上游的獨占廠商對中間財採取不同的訂價模式時，下游兩國產品的異質程度除了會影響到政府貿易政策的制定外，也會影響到下游國家的福利水準。
論文的第四章，我們將 Miller and Pazgal (2001, 2002) 提出的相對績效管理授權應用於技術移轉問題之探討，重新檢視 Saracho (2002) 以 Vickers (1985) 、 Fershtman and Judd (1987) 以及 Sklivas (1987) 管理授權對專利授權之分析。將相對績效管理授權應用至技術移轉的專利授權上，我們可以得到，隨著產品異質程度的不同，專利所有者的授權策略亦會有所改變，因此，不同的管理授權方式將會影響著專利所有者的授權策略。
This dissertation consists of three separate, while related, articles. The first essay in Chapter 2, “Firm Numbers, Input Pricing and Strategic Trade Policy in a Vertically-related Industry”, studies issues related to optimal trade policies in a vertically-related market with an upstream monopolist supplying a key intermediate good to downstream oligopoly firms that are located in two countries. The numbers of downstream firms in the two countries are different. We show that the optimal trade policies in downstream countries depend not only on the upstream monopolist’s pricing schemes, discriminatory or uniform, but also on the relative size of numbers of firms in both downstream countries. Our results yield interesting comparisons with those in Bernhofen (1997), in which optimal trade policies are examined in a setup that each downstream country only has on firm competing with each other in the final good market.
The second essay in Chapter 3, “Input Pricing, Delegation and Strategic Trade Policy in a Vertically-related Industry”, deals specifically with relative-performance delegation and trade policies in a vertically-related industry. We show that the optimal government intervention in the final-good market depends upon both the pricing scheme employed by the intermediate-good producer as well as the relative product differential if owners of firms have sufficient control over their managers’ behavior.
The third essay in Chapter 4, “Patent Licensing under Relative-performance Delegation”, revisits Saracho (2002) to analyze the effects of delegation on patent licensing. Our model differs with Saracho (2002) in the treatment of delegation. In specific, we employ the relative-performance delegation, proposed by Miller and Pazgal (2001, 2002), to examine patent licensing. Our results show that patent licensing strategies of an outsider patent holder varies with the degree of product differentiation.
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Wang, X.H. and B. Yang (2004), "On Technology Transfer to an Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly," Economics Bulletin, 4, 1-6.
 
 
 
 
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