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題名:形象及認定對貨幣政策之三個相關議題:貨幣外觀、權衡性通貨膨脹、及匯率制度變革的探討
作者:周國偉 引用關係
作者(外文):Kuo-Wei Chou
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:經濟學研究所
指導教授:曹添旺
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2009
主題關鍵詞:形象認定通貨替代時間不一致權衡性通貨膨脹第二代模型imageidentitycurrency substitutiontime inconsistencydiscretionary inflationsecond generation model
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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本文嘗試運用社會學與心理學之形象及認定的概念,據以探討總體經濟及國際金融理論中,廣受矚目之通貨替代、通貨膨脹、及通貨危機等三項議題。認定代表體系成員的類別,不同的類別皆有其特定的行為準則及規範。形象是指體系成員對彼此的觀感與印象,使體系成員在互動的過程中,影響彼此的效用,進而左右決策的制訂。在第二章中,首先延伸通貨替代的議題,結合Akerlof and Kranton(2000)對自我形象(或認定)之效用函數分析方法與Chen and Tsaur(1983)之貨幣具有流動性勞務的理論架構,建構一貨幣外觀象徵著不同政黨屬性的通貨替代模型。於分析的過程中,我們發現:
(1) 貨幣的使用除了原先交易媒介的功能外,亦可作為民眾表達政治傾向的工具;人們可以依據不同場合使用不同貨幣,藉以獲得互動下的形象利得,提升整體社會之效用水準。
(2) 若當社會面臨通貨膨脹的壓力,則此一構想相較於原先單一貨幣的發行,有助於引發超額貨幣需求,達到減緩物價上揚的效果。
在第三章中,我們首先清楚描繪政府形象之定義。執政者若以貨幣政策作為因應經濟議題的工具,則政策的制定一方面受到執政者本身對經濟議題的偏好(認定)左右;另一方面,政策後果是否影響政府在民眾的聲望(形象),也應有部分關聯。因此,分析上假定執政者的貨幣政策若侵蝕到民眾的實質購買力,將對政府形象有負面的效果,某種程度地帶給執政者主觀上的效用損失。於研討的過程中,我們發現:
(1) 執政者的形象動機,能降低使用擴張性貨幣政策的誘因。而民眾在與政府互動的過程中(對政策之預期),會事先體察執政者的這項動機,故不會有太高的預期物價,改善權衡性貨幣政策的均衡結果。
(2) 執政者注重政府形象,即關心民眾的觀感;換句話說,亦可描述為關注民情或民意的程度。本章的推導或可延伸為:較以民情導向的政府,往往會有較佳的經濟表現;或許能解釋在民主政治之下,比較不會有惡性通貨膨脹的現象發生。
第四章承襲第三章的理論模型,更進一步將執政者政策的制定,延伸至小型開放經濟體系下,匯率制度之抉擇與匯率危機等問題上。所得結論可整理為:
(1) 經濟成員對於政府決策行為的悲觀預期,是匯率危機發生的關鍵因素;一個關心形象的執政者,將能減少民眾投機性炒作的誘因,故能降低匯率危機發生的可能性。
(2) 當前經濟體質的好壞與民眾的預期息息相關,民眾根據執政者的所作所為來猜測經濟的未來走向。執政者希望維持良好形象的動機,能降低民眾對匯率的悲觀預期,因而改善當前之經濟體質,減輕通貨危機的威脅。反之,執政者輕率的決策行為(不顧形象),將是助長危機的關鍵因素。
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