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題名：公司治理與非法內線交易和資本支出效率性關連性研究
作者：王育偉
作者(外文)：Yu-Wei Wang
校院名稱：國立中正大學
系所名稱：財務金融所
指導教授：鄭揚耀
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2010
主題關鍵詞：獨立董事；非法內線交易；代理問題；家族企業；投資機會；股權結構；資本支出比率；Investment Opportunity；Ownership structure.Capital Expenditure；independent director；family business；agency problem；illegal insider trading
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主題一
公司治理機制可以降低非法內線交易.嗎？
Will Corporate Governance Reduce Illegal Insider Trading？
摘要
?本研究利用民國85年至95年間遭檢調起訴的非法內線交易事件，探討公司特性、董事會結構與股權結構對於非法內線交易事件的影響。本文發現當公司隱瞞訊息為壞消息、參與犯罪者越多、資訊不對稱越大、家族企業、沒有獨立董事或獨立董事比率較少、法人持股比率較低以及未發放董監酬勞的公司，犯罪者可以利用未公開訊息獲得的非法利益較多；此外，利用Logistic迴歸模型來探討非法內線交易發生因素時，本文發現資訊不對稱越大、家族企業、法人持股比率較低及未發放董監酬勞的公司，這類公司因代理問題或監督機制較不完備，所以導致非法內線交易的可能性增加。
關鍵詞：非法內線交易、代理問題、家族企業、獨立董事、股權結構
主題二
公司治理能降低資本支出無效率嗎？
Can Corporate governance reduce inefficient investment ？
摘要
本研究利用投資機會模型探討民國87年至96年台灣上市公司季資本支出比率分佈狀況，與Shin and Kim（2002）之實證結果不同， 本文並未發現台灣上市公司在第四季會有較多的資本支出比率。再者，本文利用投資機會虛擬變數和公司治理變數所形成的迴歸模型，探討公司治理機制對於公司投資效率性的影響，實證結果發現沒有獨立董事、非家族企業、董事會規模較小、董事持股比率、法人持股比率或外資法人持股比率較低的公司，這類公司的資本支出容易產生無效率的投資決策。此外，本研究也發現預期資本支出可以增加投資機會，然而未預期的資本支出卻會導致投資機會的減少。最後，本文的實證結果也支持董事長兼任總經理、聘任獨立董事、家族企業、董事會規模越大、董事持股比率、法人持股比率、與外資持股比率越多的公司，這些公司所做的資本支出決策能夠創造出較多的投資機會。
關鍵詞：資本支出比率、投資機會、公司治理、董事會結構、股權結構
THE FIRST TOPIC
公司治理機制可以降低非法內線交易嗎？
Will Corporate Governance Reduce Illegal Insider Trading？
Abstract
We investigate whether the corporation characteristics, the structure of the board of directors and the structure of ownership affect the illegal insider trading from 1996 to 2006. We find that the convicts using inside information can get more profits when the corporations try to cover the bad news and have more convicts, asymmetric information, no or few independence director, low institutional shareholdings or no any payment for directors. In addition, we estimate a logistic regression modeling the probability of illegal insider trading. We find that the corporations with asymmetric information, family business, low institutional stockholdings and no payment for directors, due to agency problem and poor monitoring system, are more likely to have illegal insider trading.
Key words: illegal insider trading, agency problem, family business, independent director, ownership structure.
THE SECOND TOPIC
公司治理能降低資本支出無效率嗎？
Can Corporate governance reduce inefficient investment ？
Abstract
Using the Tobin’s q investment model, we examine the distribution of quarterly capital expenditures for firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Market from the period 1998 to 2007. The empirical results do not support Shin and Kim（2002）findings that business capital investment is significantly higher in the forth quarter than in other quarters. Moreover, we test the effect of corporate governance on investment decision by employing multiple regressions which consists of variables such as firm’s investment opportunity, the structure of board and the structure of stock ownership. We find that firms with no independent director, no family control, smaller size of board, less director and institutional investor stockholdings, have incentives to make inefficient investment decisions. In addition, we find that the expected capital expenditures increase the investment opportunity. On the contrary, the unexpected capital expenditures lead up to the reduction of investment opportunity. Finally, the empirical results indicate that capital expenditures make by the firms with chairman being in general manager position, independent director in the board, with family control, bigger size of board, more shares held by directors and institutional investors, are likely to create more investment opportunity.
Keywords: Capital Expenditure, Investment Opportunity, Corporate Governance, Structure of Board, Ownership Structure.
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