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題名:非法內線交易、公司價值與公司治理關聯性之研究
作者:侯乃文
作者(外文):Nai-Wen Hou
校院名稱:國立高雄第一科技大學
系所名稱:管理研究所
指導教授:黃玉娟
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2013
主題關鍵詞:盈餘管理公司治理公司價值內線交易corporate governancefirm valueillegal insider tradingearnings management
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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近年來台灣股票市場內線交易事件頻傳,嚴重傷害證券交易市場,亦打擊投資人對市場的信心。本研究以台灣證券市場1988-2008年間因內線交易被起訴的案例為研究樣本,依據過去文獻,以公司治理機制及其他特性等四項指標為衡量公司治理良窳的替代變數,探討內線交易與公司治理間的關聯性。四大類指標包括:(一)董事會組成(board composition);(二)股權結構(ownership structure);(三)財務報表可信度(financial reporting credibility);(四)其他特性。此外防弊是公司治理消極面的功能,提升公司價值才是其積極的目標,因此本研究的第二項課題將焦點放在公司治理的積極目的上,探討健全的公司治理機制是否可以增進公司經營績效與公司價值。除了上述提及的四項變數外,再加入證基會於2003年開始辦理的「資訊揭露評鑑系統」評鑑結果,組成完整的公司治理結構,探討台灣公司治理機制與公司價值間的關聯性。
研究結果發現,內線交易與部分公司治理機制間存在關聯性。在董事會組成方面,董事長身兼總經理與內線交易成負向關係,顯示董事長身兼總經理能發揮監督功效,降低弊案發生機會。股權結構中的本國專業投資機構與內線交易呈現負相關,顯示本國投資機構持股愈高,公司發生內線交易的機率愈低。在衡量財務報表可信度的變數中,計有四項變數與內線交易呈現正相關,分別是「財務報表重編」、「董事長更換次數」、「盈餘管理」及「會計師更換次數」。我們合理推測財務報表可信度與內線交易間存在關聯性。此外,股票變更交易代表公司面臨一定程度的財務危機,隱含內部控制機制薄弱,內部人舞弊機率增加。
其次,在公司價值與公司治理關聯性的研究中,我們發現不論是以何種方式衡量公司價值,董事會組成及股權結構的變數與公司價值間的關聯性出現顯著的項目很少。顯示目前台灣在推行上市上櫃公司實施公司治理制度時,仍須以強化董事會職能為重點,同時持續執行和開放新措施以鼓勵專業投資機構發揮其應有的監督功能。
This study examines the relationship between illegal insider trading and corporate governance. I analyze a sample of 156 cases, 78 illegal insider trading episodes and 78 matched firms. I use four dimensions to measure corporate governance, including board composition, ownership structure, financial reporting credibility, and other variables. Moreover, I investigate the relationship between the firm value and corporate governance based on the same sample.
The result reveals that some variables proxy for board composition and ownership structure are significantly and negatively correlated with illegal insider trading. These include CEO duality and domestic investors. Besides, I also find that four coefficients of the six variables that proxy for financial reporting credibility are positive and significant. They are the frequency of restatements, turnover of board chairman, earnings management, and frequency of CPA switch. This suggests that firms with less financial reporting credibility have higher probability of illegal insider trading. This finding highlights the importance of credible and transparent financial statements. In addition, the firms downgraded to full-cash delivery stocks are significantly correlated with illegal insider trading, suggesting that firms with financial distress are more likely to have illegal insider trading.
However, the relationship between firm value and corporate governance is weak. This finding implies that to help prevent or curb the occurrence of illegal insider trading, the major directions for corporate governance system in Taiwan
are enhancing the responsibility of the board of directors and bringing the function of supervisors into effect.
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