台海兩岸在主權、國家認同、對等外力干預及威脅使用武力等五項敏感度高的議題上呈現六種爭議性賽局。對台灣而言，有三種是「囚徒困境賽局」，兩種是「僵持賽局」，有一個可望由「僵持」、轉為「囚徒困境」的賽局，而在中共方面，有五種為「僵持賽局」，有一種有機會從「僵持」轉為「囚徒困境」賽局。基本上，兩岸間的互動是種介於「彊持」與「囚徒困境」之間的質局，而從「僵持」轉為「囚徒困境」又以台灣方面的可能性較大，在務實程度方面台灣也明顯較大陸為高。兩岸若能成功地將前述六種賽局從「僵持」轉為「囚徒困境」，「相互合作」的可能性將可提高。其間的關鍵則在於台灣能給予大陸一種兩岸終將整合的展望，大陸則在實質與心理上提供台灣更大的安全感，進而雙方不至於陷入一場追求全贏的僵局中。

　　　　　The sensitive issues across the Taiwan Strait with respect to sovereignty, national identification, parity, foreign intervention and threat of force can be organized as six games. On behalf of Taiwan, three of them are "prisoner's dilemma games", while two of them are "deadlock games". On behalf of Chinese Mainland, five of them are "deadlock games". One of them is expected to transfer from a "deadlock game" into a "prisoner's dilemma game" for both sides. Basically, the interactions across the Taiwan Strait can be classified as a game to swing between deadlock and prisoner's dilemma. Compared with that of Chinese Mainland, the possibility of Taiwan to shift from a "deadlock game" into a "prisoner's dilemma game" is higher. In other words , Taiwan is more pragmatic than Chinese Mainland. If Beijing and Taipei are able to transfer their games from deadlock into prisoner's dilemma, the prospect of "mutual cooperation" across the Taiwan Strait will be much brighter. The key to enhance this possibility is dependent upon whether or not Taiwan is able to maintain its long-term goal of Chinese reunification and upon whether or not Chinese Mainland is able to provide Taiwan with sufficient sense of security. Otherwise, the game across the Taiwan Strait will end up with a deadlock.