This paper will examine the slotting allowances from manufacturers to retailers, analyzing where the problem is and how to regulate it on competition law. First, the slotting allowances demanded by retailers can be divided into five categories: slotting fees, risk or cost sharing, promotion fees, bonus (afterward discounts) and failure fees, each of then with some anti-competitive or unfair trading aspects. These problems can be summed up as three dimensions: excessive pricing of retailers, price non-transparency, and the abuse of privileged bargaining position. After reviewing the market power of large retailers, the possibilities of defeating competitors from the retail market, and the inefficiency of resources allocation, this paper believes the excessive pricing of dominant retailers should be prohibited. In addition, owing to the disturbance to the price mechanism and anti-competitive effects resulting from the diversity of allowances, the price anti-transparency of retail channel should also be regulated. As to the abuse of privileged bargaining position, it is in essence an unfair trade practice. When retailers with some market power abusing their bargaining position, manufacturers can resort to administrative regulation against it. But for retailers without market power, as a matter of civil dispute, they can only, in my viewpoint, seek civil remedies in the court. Back to the law-enforcing practices of Taiwan's competition authority, Fair Trade Commission, this paper finds that the attention it paid to the dimension of excessive pricing and price non-transparency is badly not enough. It is important for the Commission to strengthen its law enforcement and research on this issue from now on. As a starting point for further research, this work tries to establish a regulatory framework about his issue, which is not only for your knowledge, but also useful for the regulation in the real world.