自從1998年政府開放與中國大陸定點直航以來，多家海運航商紛紛進入此一新興市場，使得已趨於飽和之東亞海運市場競爭益趨激烈。由於海運市場近年來的經營環境十分艱困，因此航商間遂以結盟降低成本。為分析寡占海運市場各航商間所具有的既競爭又合作之關係'本研究從合作賽局理論的觀點，分析灣靠台灣之國內外主要航商的各種聯盟競爭之態勢。在方法上，本研究首先定義海運航商之策略聯盟方式，並建立艙位互租與共同派船策略下航商聯盟的報酬函數。報酬函數則包含:海運需求模式、託運人之航商選擇模式以及海運成本模式。本研究以託運人(包括貿易、製造商，以及海運承攬業)與航商之問卷調查結果，進行模式之校估。建構報酬函數之後，本文依據合作賽局理論之夏普利值(Shapley value)與競爭模式，分析各航商可能之結盟方式，並計算市場均衡運價。最後，本文以行駛於台灣與上海之主要航商為例，進行實證分析，探討合作賽局求解結果所顯示之意義。此一結果，將可做為航運公司與航運主管機關，在制定相關決策時之參考。

As the restrictions on direct services across Taiwan Strait had been removed in 1998, many container carriers joined the newly developed market. Due to the vigorous competition in the business, more carriers tried to form alliance to increase market shares. This study aimed to explore the interaction among allied carries by applying cooperative game theory to the oligopolistic market under the practice of cross-slot charters and joint services. The paper began with the definitions and practice of strategic alliances. Next, it formulated the payoff functions among various coalition relationships. Then, the payoff functions, which consist of the demand model of container cargo, the choice model of container carriers, and the cost model, were calibrated using survey data collected from major shippers such as manufacturers, traders, and forwarders. Then solution approaches to solve the shipping rates under various coalitional scenarios in the market equilibrium were proposed. The solution concepts of the Shapley Values and Nucleolus were applied to calculate the shares of the profits for all allied carriers in the cooperative games. Finally, a case study based on data collected from shippers who transport containers from Taiwan to Shanghai was presented. The results were analyzed and evaluated such that the information could be used as a guidance for the decision-makers and policy-formers in the maritime business.