本文分析司法釋憲機關是否，或於何種條件下，能夠以釋憲的方式定位在政治上極有爭議的「兩岸關係」。作者同時自「司法釋憲機關在權力分立下的角色」，以及「兩岸關係憲法定位爭議的性質」二個方向析論此一問題。 與國內學界多數意見不同，本文支持司法院大法官釋字第三二八號解釋，引進「政治問題」理論以拒絕正面解釋有關兩岸關係憲法定位的做法；也支持大法官在其他相關解釋中，儘量避免對兩岸關係的憲法定位，作全面性，一般性論斷之自制態度。 理由之一是：在權力分立原則下，司法釋憲權本應有其界限，不宜處理與司法本全不合的事項，也不應以不合司法性質的方法行使職權。但我國獨樹一格的「疑義解釋」制度，卻有背於權力分立下司法所應有的角色。因此，在限制之下，作者認為以「政治問題」排除「不合司法特質」的聲請案，為大法官維持其司法本色的必要手段。其次，兩岸關係的本質，涉及國家定位的基本價值，宜藉由民主思辯的途徑來處理，而不適宜由較為欠缺民主負責性的司法機關，在政治法律與資訊都不成熟的情形下，做貿然的論斷。司法自制的態度，至少在目前是一個真正符合憲法民主的做法。

　　　　　This Article attempts to analyze whether or to what extent the judiciary is adequate to define the constitutional status of cross-strait relationship. The author explores this issue in terms of “the appropriate role of the judiciary under the Separation-of-Power principle” and “the character of cross-strait relationship issues”. Contrary to most scholars’ opinion, the author argues for citing “Political Question” doctrine to avoid directly interpreting the issues with respect to the cross-strait relations, as the Grand Justices had done in Interpretation No. 328. This article also supports the other relevant Grand Justices Interpretations insofar as they adopted the attitude of “judicial self-restraint” in avoidance of rendering the general, comprehensive theory of cross-strait relationship. Such conclusions are based upon the following reasoning. First, judicial power in interpreting the Constitution should have its boundary in light of separated powers. Nonetheless, the unique “constitutional inquiry” mechanism would easily make the Grand Justices exercise authority in ways contrary to the judicial essence. Therefore, against this backdrop, employing “Political Question” would be a necessary means in ensuring the judicial integrity. Secondly, the constitutional definition of cross-strait relations is more appropriate to be resolved by democratic deliberation than by democratic deliberation than by judicial fiat. Thus, judiciary should not render any sort of categorical rulings when the context is not nature enough.