無論是個人或團體組織的政治參與，當遭遇彼此之間利害關係的衝突時，往往是因為各自背負的值值信念之不同使然，此時更難尋獲政治上之公義原則。羅爾斯(Joho Rawls, 1921-2002)區分價值觀與權利觀之同，要立約各方假設在無知之幕內以注重需求而非以注重理想為考量，才可能得出合理的共識。但雷茲(Joseph Raz)質疑無知之幕不必全部取消立約各方的價值觀，甚至採取某些價值觀可能更容易導致政治的原則。本文認為，減少政治參與的衝突，從羅爾斯的權利觀來看，降低價值觀的介入而進行無知之幕的假想仍想是值得思考的方向。然而，許多論者仍然質疑價值觀在政治參與中乃揮之不去之因素，羅爾斯並沒有否認這種事實，他提出自由政治主義的觀念，雖然價值觀會影響個人的決擇，但落入政治對領域應以權利為優先，找出交疊共識。此一方向在一定程度內可以消解政治參與中價值中立與否的問題。

　　　　　John Rawls distinguished the conception of the right and the conception of the good. He argued that the parties of in the veil of ignorance could choice the principle of justice without ideal-regarding consideration. But Joseph Raz criticized Rawls' argument. He thought that in the veil of ignorance the person was affected unavoidably to accept some ideals or moral principles from his conception of the good. Rawls maintained that the idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just. And the aim is to use the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of theory. The veil of ignorance is like a thought-experiment that contributed to think how to dissolve vary conflicts from different the conception of good. Rawls supposed that the essential element in his「political liberalism」is the idea of the priority of right. And the right and the good are complementary: a political conception must draw upon various ideas of the good. Goodness as rationality provides part of a framework serving two main roles: first it helps us to identify a workable list of primary goods; and second, it enables us both a specify the aims of the parties in the original position and to explain why whose aims are rational.