The early criticism of Cook, Lorenzen, Yntena, Cavers and others led to the “fall from grace” of the vested rights approach of the First Restatement. It was not until the late 1950s, in the words of Hill: “The revolution in choice of law was inaugurated, and indeed accomplished, largely by the writing of one man, the late Brainerd Currie, in a feat without parallel in the history of the common law.” Hill was cautiously modified by Posnak as “Currie had more influence on conflicts law than any commentator, if not person, has had on any area of the common law.” The crux of Currie’s approach is that in choosing between competing laws, courts should take into account the policies behind those laws and the facts of the particular case. Currie and his precursors argued that it is inherently unsound to choose between competing law without reference to the content of those laws, as the vested rights approach did. Firmly believing in policy analyses, in my previous writing, I vehemently advocated the importance of dentifying the prevailing value of the competing policies. In my personal opinion, this “multistate theory” (as Leflar kindly maned it) perhaps to certain extent approved by Reese and Leflar in some aspects. However, for years I have been deeply disturbed by the possible controversy engendered by the identification of the prevailing value. Sudden enlightenment came when one day I decide to forgo the facade’ of identifying the prevailing value, and leave the daunting task to domestic lawyers to do their job. After studying in Taiwan, London and the U.S., I know that in the field of conflict of laws, most of the doctrinal resources are the same resources the court would use in a purely domestic case. As Currie in his celebrated article wrote: “it is time to return to methods that are indigenous to our legal system and that our judges and lawyers are fully competent to utilized by reason of their training and experience.” I have dwelt on substantive law methodology all my life, deep in my heart I know I am heading the right and only path of conflict of laws, but am I? The new German and British choice of laws rules for torts, obviously espouse the idea of the most significant relationship test of the Second Restatement. However while the Second Restatement repeatedly emphasized the importance of analyzing he policies of the involved stated (in section 6(2)(b), Section 6(2)(e), Section 6(2)(c) and comment (b)), those European new codes ignore the revolutionary trend of the last century. Those European new codes in the words of Maguire v. Exeter & Hampton Elec. Co (114N.H. 589, 325A. 2d 778 (1974), “lies in the backwater of the modern stream.” Those “new” codes are what Cavers called “jurisdiction – selecting rules” in 1933, if I were not in a civilian country, I would not waste my precious life to comment on such anachronistic rules. I concur with Posnak, but I am tempted to modify his statement as: “Currie had more influence on conflicts of law than any commentator, if not person, has had on any area of the law.”S