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題名:公開發行公司高階經理人報酬決定與監督之研究
書刊名:臺北大學法學論叢
作者:張心悌 引用關係
作者(外文):Chang, Hsin-ti
出版日期:2006
卷期:58
頁次:頁1-42
主題關鍵詞:經理人報酬公司治理經理人報酬結構報酬委員會報酬揭露報酬監督股東提案權Executive compensationCorporate governanceCompensation structureCompensation committeeCompensation disclosureCompensation monitoringShareholder proposal
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(6) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:6
  • 共同引用共同引用:34
  • 點閱點閱:95
我國有關經理人報酬之相關法律規定十分簡單,且相關法律文章討論極少。此或許一方面由於我國經理人報酬之數額,相較於美國經理人報酬之天文數字,普遍並不高;另一方面由於經理人多有相當持股,導致經理人較重視股價變動之投資價值。然而,經理人報酬係屬股份有限公司所有權與經營權分離所形成代理成本(agency costs)之一環,且為公司治理良窳之指標之一,實值得加以重視。 不同於國內外文獻多係討論報酬數額過高之問題,本文係就公司經理人報酬之分析乃強調報酬|決定過程(process)之公平性,以及如何強化對經理人報酬之監督。 就經理人報酬之決定過程言,我國並未如美國設有報酬委員會(compensation committee)之規定,惟在美國法之實踐下,報酬委員會是否得公平決定經理人之報酬,誠不無疑問。因此,報酬決定權應分配於何機關,以及決定過程應如何規定,即有研究之必要。同時,為達到資訊之透明性,公司報酬政策(policy)、決定過程與結果亦應有適當之揭露。再者,透過股東、法院以及市場之監督,包括股東對經理人報酬之提案權、股東代表訴訟,以及經由公司控制權市場(market for corporate control)等各種監督機制是否能有效監督經理人報酬,亦為本文討論之重點。
The laws governing executive compensation are quite simple and the relevant discussions on this issue are rare in Taiwan. This might be due to two reasons: first, the pay level of executive compensation in Taiwan is not as surprisingly high as that in the United States, and second, it is common that in Taiwan executives also hold considerable shares in the company; therefore, they regard share price increase more than compensations. However, executive compensation itself is a part of the agency problem and is the acid test of corporate governance. Thus, executive compensation is worthy of our attention and research. Different from other studies addressing the problem of executives’ high pay level, this paper emphasizes on the analysis of the pay setting process and how to effectively monitor and discipline the executive pay. For the pay setting process, the most important issue is who has the authority to determine the compensation policy, process and pay level. There is no compensation committee in Taiwan. However, from the experience of the United States, compensation committee still suffers from some flaws in reaching arm’s length negotiation and fair compensations. In addition, the compensation policy, pay setting process and resu1t should be adequately disclosed. Furthermore, the various monitoring and disciplinary mechanisms, such as shareholder proposal, shareholder approval on stock option, shareholder derivative suit, market for corporate control, to name a few, will also be discussed and analyzed in this paper.
期刊論文
1.Fischel, Daniel R.(1982)。Race to the Bottom Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law。Northwestern University Law Review,76,913-920。  new window
2.廖大穎(20020800)。認股權憑證與員工紅利--論員工股份選擇權(Stock Option)新制度。臺灣本土法學雜誌,37,79-95。  延伸查詢new window
3.Borokhovich, Kenneth A.(1997)。CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments。Journal of Finance,52(4),1495-1517。  new window
4.Bebchuk, Lucian A.、Fried, Jesse M.、Walker, David I.(2002)。Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation。The University of Chicago Law Review,69(3),751-846。  new window
5.Manne, Henry G.(1965)。Merger and the Market for Corporate Control。The Journal of Political Economy,73(2),110-120。  new window
6.林國全(20030700)。公司經理人之概念。臺灣本土法學雜誌,48,131-135。  延伸查詢new window
7.Black, Bernard S.(1992)。Agents watching agents: The promise of institutional investor voice。UCLA Law Review,39(4),811-893。  new window
8.Fama, Eugene F.(1980)。Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm。Journal of Political Economy,88(2),288-307。  new window
9.Jensen, Michael C.、Meckling, William H.(1976)。Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure。Journal of Financial Economics,3(4),305-360。  new window
10.林嬋娟、辜秋屏、辜秋萍(1997)。國內上市公司高階主管酬勞知多少?。會計研究月刊,139,52-63。  延伸查詢new window
11.Thomas, R. S.、Martin, K. J.、Thomas, Randall S.、Martin, Kenneth J.(1999)。The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation。University of Cincinnati Law Review,67。  new window
12.Bainbridge, Stephen M.(2002)。Director Primacy in Corporate Takeover: Preliminary Reflection。Stanford Law Review,55。  new window
13.Bialkin, Kenneth J.、Grossman, Richard J.(1992)。The Permissible Scope of Shareholder Bylaw Amendment in New York, 1 Corp.。Governance Advisor,25。  new window
14.Braunstein, Jaclyn(1998)。Pound Foolish: Challenging Executive Compensation in the U.S. and the U.K.。Brooklyn Journal of International Law,29。  new window
15.Kreinberg, Joshua A.(1995)。Note, Reaching Beyond Performance Compensation in Attempts to Own the Corporate Executive。Duke Law Journal,45。  new window
16.Loewenstein, Mark J.(2000)。The Conundrum of Executive Compensation。Wake Forest Law Review,35。  new window
17.Longstreth, Bevis、Kane, Nancy(1992)。Shareholders Growing Role in Executive Compensation。New York Law Journal。  new window
18.Marino, Lori B.(1999)。Executive Compensation and the Misplaced Emphasis on Increasing Shareholder Access to the Proxy。University of Pennsylvania Law Review,147。  new window
19.Thomas, Randall S.、Martin, Kenneth J.(2000)。The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans。Wake Forest Law Review,35。  new window
20.Thomas, Randall S.、Martin, Kenneth J.(2001)。Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?。Washington University Law Quarterly,79。  new window
21.Useem, Jerry(2003)。Have They No Shame?。Fortune。  new window
22.Yablon, Charles M.(1992)。Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay in Search of Excess。Columbia Law Review,92。  new window
23.(2004)。Slimming the Fat Cats? Evaluating the New York Stock Exchange Listing Standards Requiring Shareholder Approval of Stock Option Plans。Harvard Law Review,117。  new window
研究報告
1.Murphy, K. J.、Murphy, Kevin(1998)。Executive Compensation。沒有紀錄。  new window
2.Bebchuk, Lucian A.(2003)。The Case for Empowering Shareholders, Berkeley Olin Program in Law and Economics。0。  new window
圖書
1.Bebchuk, Lucian A.、Fried, Jesse M.(2004)。Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation。Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press。  new window
2.Berle, A.、Means, G.(1968)。The Modern Corporation and Private Property。New Brunswick, New Jersey:Transaction Publishers。  new window
3.Easterbrook, Frank H.、Fischel, Daniel R.(1991)。The Economic Structure of Corporate Law。Harvard University Press。  new window
4.王文宇(2005)。公司法論。元照。  延伸查詢new window
5.劉連煜(2005)。股東表決權之行使與公司治理。現代公司法制之新課題:賴英照大法官六秩華誕祝賀論文集。臺北市。  延伸查詢new window
6.王文宇(2005)。論董事會、常董會與委員會之權責劃分。現代公司法制之新課題:賴英照大法官六秩華誕祝賀論文集。臺北市。  延伸查詢new window
7.(2003)。行政院改革公司治理專案小組會議錄。行政院改革公司治理專案小組會議錄。0。  延伸查詢new window
8.曾宛如(2003)。公司管理與資本市場法制專論(一)。公司管理與資本市場法制專論(一)。臺北市。new window  延伸查詢new window
9.Crystal, Graef S.(1991)。In Search of Excess。In Search of Excess。0。  new window
10.Gilson, Ronald J.(1992)。Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance。Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance。0。  new window
11.Klein, William A.、Coffee, John C.(1996)。Business Organization and Finance - Legal and Economic Principles。Business Organization and Finance - Legal and Economic Principles。0。  new window
圖書論文
1.王志誠(200508)。我國公司治理之實務發展及檢討--以並列制經營機關之改革為中心。現代公司法制之新課題--賴英照大法官六秩華誕祝賀論文集。元照。  延伸查詢new window
2.張心悌(2005)。股東提案權之省思--兼以代理成本與Arrow定理觀察之。現代公司法制之新課題:賴英照大法官六秩華誕祝賀論文集。臺北市:元照。  延伸查詢new window
 
 
 
 
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