2002 年通過的證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法（「投保法」）以及 2003 年設立的證券投資人及期貨交易人保護中心（「投保中心」）開創了臺灣證券團體訴訟的新紀元。作為法律創設的非營利組織，投保中心可以為在證券事件中受害之投資人提起團體訴訟。2009 年投保法的修正，進一步擴大了投保中心的權限，使其可以提起代位訴訟與裁判解任訴訟。在 2009 年的修正後，學者對於投保中心提起之代位訴訟或裁判解任訴訟之性質，提出質疑：既然這些訴訟之目的係為公司求償或將公司之人員解職，投保中心提起 這樣的訴訟是否有其公益性？上述關於訴訟公益性的討論激發了本文的研究。本文並非著眼於投保中 心的股東角色或是訴訟求償的歸屬，而是嘗試從投保中心在證券團體訴訟與裁判解任訴訟中實際採取的作法加以檢視。實務上，投保中心在證券團體訴訟中對於持有人請求的限縮，以及其在裁判解任訴訟中，將之朝向董事失格制度來解釋。凡此都更突顯出投保中心訴訟的公益性。本文繼之從三個面向提出建議，認為投保中心可以強化其公益性。首先，投保中心在提起證券團體訴訟時，應依個案情形審慎考慮是否將發行人（公司）列為被告加以求償。第二，裁判解任中關於「業務執行」的規定應可做更廣義的解釋。第三，由於投保中心已有充足之提起訴訟的權利，因此在面對經常引起爭議的公司控制權交易時，證券主管機關在管制上應寧可失之過寬。投保中心的公益性固然應被肯認，但也並非沒有問題。本文最後指出公益、投資人之利益與投保中心之利益可能存在的衝突。現存以投保中心為主之代表訴訟體制，顯然並非完美，而有待未來的改善。

The enactment of Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act (“Act”) in 2002 and the establishment of Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Center (“IPC”) in 2003 marked a new era of securities class actions in Taiwan. The IPC, a government-sanctioned non-profit organization, can initiate class actions for securities investors who are harmed in a securities incident. The 2009 amendment of this Act further empowers the IPC to bring derivative suits and removal suits against its directors or supervisors. In the wake of the 2009 amendment, some scholars cast a doubt on the nature of the derivative suits or removal suits brought by the IPC. Is an IPC-initiated derivative suit and removal suit whose purpose is to recover damage or remove someone from office for the private corporation regarded as a public interest suit? Discussion on the nature of derivative suits as well as other litigations brought by the IPC inspires this article. Instead of focusing on IPC’s shareholdership or who is entitled to compensation, this article reexamines what the IPC actually does in securities class actions and removal suits. The IPC undercuts the holders’ claims in securities class actions and tries to make the removal suits function as director disqualification regime. Such approaches shed strong light on the public interest nature of the IPC-initiated actions. This article then offers suggestions in three aspects for the IPC to reinforce its role in pursuing public interest. First, the IPC should consider not to list the issuer-corporation as one of the defendants in a securities class action. Second, the term of “carrying out business” in removal suits should be broadly construed. Third, as the IPC is fully empowered, the securities regulators may err on the side of under-regulating corporate control transactions which are often controversial. The public interest mindset of the IPC is rightfully recognized but not without any questions. The last part of this article points out the potential conflicts among the public interest, the investors’ interest and the IPC’s own interest. The IPC-centered representative litigation regime is far from perfect and needs to be fixed.