本文首先分析康德的「超驗」概念，由此展開討論「超驗認知」的理論問題。所謂「超驗認知」是有關認知能力本身的先驗認知，包括感性和知性的區分，以及時空範疇條件等。雖然康德的超驗哲學以研究主體的認知能力為核心，以解釋客觀經驗和知識的可能性，但是這些「超驗認知」本身的理論地位卻不甚清楚。一方面，它們不能是透過內感而得到關於「現象我」的描述，因為這些最多只是經驗認知，不能作為超驗哲學的基礎；另一方面，康德又批判傳統理性心理學，認為我們不能僅透過理性推論而得到關於「本體我」的先驗認知。對康德而言，根本不存在任何先驗的「自我認知」，但他卻容許智性的「自我意識」，即「純粹我思」或「超驗統覺」。由於缺乏相應的內感，超驗統覺本身還不算是認知，但透過反思的抽象和比較活動，我們能分析認知結構。不過超驗認知並非直接關於人類這個物種的認知機制。康德的超驗哲學不是認知科學或超驗心理學，而是對於有限理性者的認知結構的概念分析。

This paper begins with an analysis of Kant's concept of "transcendental", and proceeds to discuss some theoretical problems of transcendental cognition. Transcendental cognition refers to a kind of a priori cognitions about the faculty of cognition itself, which include the distinction between sensibility and understanding as well as their spatiotemporal and categorial forms. Although Kant's transcendental philosophy aims to account for the possibility of objective experience and knowledge by investigating into our faculty of cognition, the theoretical status of transcendental cognitions itself is rather unclear. On the one hand, they cannot be cognitions of the phenomenal self through inner sense, because these empirical cognitions could never serve as a foundation for the transcendental philosophy. On the other hand, Kant also criticizes traditional rational psychology, rejecting the possibility of a priori cognitions of the noumenal self through reason alone. It is true that Kant denies every possibility of a priori self-cognition, but he does allow a kind of intellectual self-consciousness, i.e., the pure "I think" or "transcendental apperception". Transcendental apperception is not cognition, but through transcendental reflection, we can analyze the structure of cognition. Yet, transcendental cognition is not primarily about the cognitive mechanism of human beings as a species. Kant's transcendental philosophy is not cognitive science or transcendental psychology, but rather a kind of conceptual analysis of the structure of cognition of the finite rational being as such.