我國證交法第157條之1通說以之為制裁內線交易之主要法源，且從立法歷史觀察，應係源自於美國法。然而，同樣以美國證交法section10(b)為師之我國證交法第20條卻自內線交易之論述中缺席，耐人尋味。相同的，證交法第157條之1的構成要件究應如何解釋也時有爭論，包括何謂因職業關係而知悉消息，又或者消息傳遞者是否應有忠實義務之違反在先，消息受領者有交易行為在後，方始構成內線交易等均有闡明之必要。 然而，更重要的是，究竟我國禁止內線交易所欲保護之法益為何？這不僅關係到第20條第1項之角色，也關係到內部人之範圍、內線交易所涉標的、內線交易之發生場合、因果關係、損害賠償責任之必要性及免責事由之設計等要件。因此，在不斷修法之過程中，我們似應先行確定內線交易之保護法益，而後方得重新建構相關要件。

Article 157-1 of Taiwan's Securities and Exchange Law is generally regarded as the main source of regulation in relation to insider dealing. When compared with the American law, it seems to be correct. However, Article 20 of the Securities and Exchange Law, which is also transplanted from §10(b) of the American Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the main enforcement tool for punishing insider dealing in the United States, is entirely ignored in the analyses of Taiwan's insider dealing. This phenomenon is quite bizarre. Besides, Article 157-1 is not self-evident; a tremendous amount of interpretation is required to arrive at a clear understanding in terms of whether or not the tipper should violate his (her) fiduciary duty in order to transfer the derivative duties to the tippee. Before answering the above-mentioned questions, an important prerequisite is to identify what the legal interests of the insider dealing regulation in Taiwan are. Do we believe in the theory of anti-fraud or the protection of market integrity? The choice will affect the scope of the insiders, the objects covered by insider dealing, the place where insider dealing takes place, the causation, the need for damages and the defenses. As a result, it is even more important to re-consider the purpose of the insider dealing regulation before making any further amendments to it. This will help us re-build the rules and establish a consistent set of theories.