保險業經營具有高度的社會性，再加上我國保險法對董監事及經理人課以無限清償責任，此特有的高度監理法規，提供檢視公司治理結構與保險公司風險決策行為關係之特殊研究環境。本文主要探討保險業之代理問題及其對保險業風險決策行為的影響。本研究蒐集保險業公司治理結構變數，採用迴歸模型分析公司治理對保險公司整體營運、業務與投資風險決策行為之影響。實證結果發現，保險公司股東投票權偏離現金流量權的幅度以及股權集中度對於保險業風險決策行為有正向影響；而現金流量請求權、董事會規模、獨立董事、總經理兼任董事長等變數，對於風險決策行為有負向影響。另外，內部經理人持股率與投資風險決策行為呈現倒U型關係。

This paper investigates the impacts of corporate governance structures on risk taking behavior in the insurance industry. The corporate governance structure of the insurance industry in Taiwan, which holds board members fully responsible for cases of bankruptcy, offers an interesting environment in which to explore its unique regulatory impact on insurers' risk taking behavior. The evidence shows that, even under stricter regulatory rules, corporate governance still plays an important role in influencing risk taking by both property-liability and life insurers in Taiwan. Specifically, deviations of voting rights from cash-flow rights and ownership concentration have positive impacts on risk taking, whereas cash-flow rights, board size, board independence, and CEO duality have negative impacts on insurers' risk taking. The relationship between investment risk and insider ownership is inversely U-shaped.