Although revolving around the ethical issues raised by life science, bioethics is intimated related to traditional ethics regarding the foundation of ethics. In this article, we take Engelhard's The Foundations of Bioethics as the reference point, stating how Confucianism responds to the relativism and nihilism presented in post-modem ethics and how Confucianism provides an ordinary and secular ethics whereby to communicate with people of different moral backgrounds, that is, to make the communication between moral strangers possible. Here it is assumed that Engelhard's demand of ordinary and secular ethics and his construction of general ethics are different in approaches but similar in results. As for Confucianism and even ethics of all civilizations, they all have double faces. On the one hand, Confucianism offers a set of substantial and concrete ethics through the education of rites; on the other hand, it provides a set of ordinary and secular (namely, general, insubstantial and ordinary) ethics through benevolence and conscience. These two kinds of ethics are inevitably interactive rather than mutually exclusive. Then, we also explain here whether this inward approach-"don't do unto others what you don't want others do unto you"-can efficiently construct a set of ethics that possesses the two aforementioned faces. Based eventually on reasonable beliefs, this paper explains that the Confucian concepts of benevolence and conscience are the products of practical knowledge. Though we can't infer effectively in logic their generality, these beliefs are reasonable because they are based on practice and reason, which provide the grounds, through dialogues and self-negation, for a kind of open progresses and beliefs as the way to settle oneself down. Finally, it is stressed that from benevolence and conscience to the substance of the education of rites and music, there should be intermediate principles of morality which construct the logical relationship in theory and operation between the ordinary and secular morality and the concrete and substantial morality, improving on the operability of the principles of morality. In the meantime, concrete ethics is inevitably founded in correspondence with concrete life; therefore, the richness of experience is very important. Here we emphasize specifically the concepts of Zhu Xi's "studying the phenomena of nature in order to acquire knowledge" and Xun Zi's "modeling after latter kings" to enrich the concreteness of the principles of morality. All in all, Confucianism is an on-going progress rather than finished and completed entity. Confucianism is fully aware that it is not necessarily the one and only ethics, but one valuable ethics, that is, one of the many manifestations. And yet, any manifestations contain part of the one principle; and this is the common way that Confucianism aspires for.