本文以1998年至2009年任職臺灣司法院的大法官為研究對象，估計其理想點，以實證分析方法研究影響其司法行為的決定因素。又， 臺灣違憲審查制度的建立與發展，與該國由一黨專政的威權體制轉型為新興民主政體息息相關，故其在個案研究上更具價值。根據本文研 究結果，亦即估計出來的理想點顯示，首先，無法證明總統與其提名、任用之大法官具有政治結盟的關係。其次，除少數例外，絕大多數大法官的理想點均分佈在中庸地帶。最後，對於作者群先前運用計量經濟分析，否定態度性假設的研究成果，本文也再度確認司法院大法官並不傾向響應其提名人的政黨利益。

ABSTRACT This paper extends the empirical analysis of the determinants of judicial behavior by estimating the ideal points for the Justices of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court from 1988-2009. Taiwan presents a particularly interesting case because the establishment and development of constitutional review corresponds to the country’s political transition from an authoritarian regime to an emerging democracy. The estimated ideal points allow us to focus on political coalitions in the Judicial Yuan based on presidential appointments. We did not find any strong evidence of such coalitions. Our empirical results indicated that, with the exception of a handful of Justices, most of them have moderate estimated ideal points. In the context of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court, our results also confirm the previous econometric analysis that largely rejected the attitudinal hypothesis, which predicted that Justices would respond to their appointers’ party interests.