不同於先進民主國家違憲審查機關的「憲法之維護者」角色，我國大法官的角色猶如「沉默的制憲者」，在我國憲政體制的發展上，發揮了制度類型抉擇的功能。若觀察大法官釋憲對我國憲政體制的形塑作用，便可充分體察我國大法官此一特殊的角色與功能。大法官釋憲、修憲與憲政運作，是形塑我國憲政體制的三股力量，從1994 年第三次修憲確立我國憲政體制為半總統制至今，大法官釋憲與修憲、憲政運作三股力量彼此牽引，共同形塑我國的憲政體制類型。在這形塑的過程中，亦可發現大法官釋憲與修憲之間，以及大法官釋憲與憲政運作之間，發生互動關係。由於大法官身為司法者，修憲與憲政運作這兩項形塑憲政體制的動力則屬政治權力運作的一環，因此由大法官釋憲此一司法因素與修憲、憲政運作兩項政治因素相互牽引形塑憲政體制的過程中，以及此一司法因素與另兩項政治因素兩兩發生互動的過程中，亦可看出司法與政治的糾葛，以及我國大法官無法避免的政治性。

Judicial review, constitution-amending and constitutional practice are the three forces which shape Taiwan’s constitutional system. Focusing on the role of judicial review, this paper explores how judicial review interacts with constitution-amending and constitutional practice to shape Taiwan’s constitutional system since the 1994 constitutional revision. The paper finds that there are interactions not only between judicial review and constitution-amending, but also between judicial review and constitutional practice in the shaping of Taiwan’s constitutional system. Instead of “the guardian angel of the constitution” which judicial reviewers usually play in mature democracies, the Grand Justices in Taiwan’s nascent democracy seem to be “the silent maker of the constitution.” This special phenomenon also implies the inevitable fate of the Grand Justices to be “political,” and the entanglement of the judiciary in politics.