:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
題名:公司治理機制對信用評等影響之研究
書刊名:玄奘管理學報
作者:彭雅惠呂佩珊
出版日期:2011
卷期:8:1
頁次:頁49-74
主題關鍵詞:公司治理信用評等次序邏輯斯迴歸Corporate governanceCredit ratingsOrdered logistic regression
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(3) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:3
  • 共同引用共同引用:97
  • 點閱點閱:128
本研究之目的在探討公司治理機制是否影響公司的信用評等,亦即檢驗是否擁有健全公司治理的企業,比起不健全公司治理的企業有比較好的信用評分等級。本研究以國內上市公司為樣本,研究期間為民國90年至94年,共計取得521家上市公司樣本。利用Ordered Logistic迴歸模型進行分析,研究結果發現在控制公司特性後,董(監)事組成、股權結構及管理型態變數對信用評等有顯著的影響。本研究採用台灣企業信用風險指標(TCRI)做為信用評等的替代變數,其共分為1至10個等級,等級1優於等級2,以此類推,等級數愈大,代表信用評等愈差。實證結果發現,獨立董監席次與信用評等為負向關係且與股權集中度為正向關係。此外,信用評等與外部大股東持股、法人持股和內部人持股呈現負向關係,但與股份盈餘偏離程度呈現正向關係。此外,董事長兼總經理與信用評等為正向關係。本研究結果證實,公司治理越佳之企業其信用評等結果也越佳。
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and credit ratings that is whether firms with strong corporate governance benefit from higher credit ratings relative to firms with weaker governance. The sample consists of 521 publicly listed firms and the sample period is from 2001 to 2005. Adopting the ordered logistic regression model, the research results show that credit ratings are significantly influenced by board independence, ownership structure and management type after controlling for firm-specific risk characteristics. Since the study uses the TCRI indices as the proxy for credit ratings which range from level 1 (the best) to 10 (the worse), credit ratings are negatively related to the number of independent directors and positively related to the number of board members controlled by the controlling shareholders. Moreover, credit ratings are negatively associated with the holdings of outside blockholders and institutional shareholders as well as insider shareholdings, but positively related to the deviation of cashflow rights from equity rights. As to the management type, CEO duality is positively related to credit ratings. These results confirm that firms with strong corporate governance will benefit from high credit ratings.
期刊論文
1.Gordon, L. A.、Pound, J.(1993)。Information, ownership structure, and shareholder voting: Evidence from shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposals。Journal of Finance,48(2),697-718。  new window
2.黃旭輝、王育偉(20071000)。績效不佳的經理人會被撤換嗎?。證券市場發展,19(3)=75,49-85。new window  延伸查詢new window
3.Bhojraj, S.、Sengupta, P.(2003)。Effect of corporate governance on bond ratings and yields: The role of institutional investors and the outside directors。The Journal of Business,76(3),455-475。  new window
4.Bhagat, Sanjai、Bernard, Black(1999)。The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm performance。Business Lawyer,54(3),921-963。  new window
5.Oswald, Sharon L.、Jahera, John S. Jr.(1991)。The Influence of Ownership on Performance: An Empirical Study。Strategic Management Journal,12(4),321-326。  new window
6.Morck, Randall、Shleifer, Andrei、Vishny, Robert W.(1988)。Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis。Journal of Financial Economics,20(1/2),293-315。  new window
7.Johnson, Simon、Boone, Peter D.、Breach, Alasdair、Friedman, Eric(2000)。Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis。Journal of Financial Economics,58(1/2),141-186。  new window
8.Yeh, Yin-Hua、Lee, Tsun-Siou、Woidtke, Tracie(2001)。Family control and corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan。International Review of Finance,2(1/2),21-48。  new window
9.Yermack, David(1996)。Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors。Journal of Financial Economics,40(2),185-211。  new window
10.Agrawal, Anup、Knoeber, Charles R.(1996)。Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders。The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,31(3),377-397。  new window
11.Bhagat, Sanjai、Black, Bernard S.(2002)。The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance。Journal of Corporation Law,27(2),231-273。  new window
12.王元章(20011000)。內部人持股、風險、股利、負債、投資與公司價值。證券市場發展季刊,13(3)=51,29-70。new window  延伸查詢new window
13.Kim, Jeong-Bon、Yi, Cheong H.(2006)。Ownership Structure, Business Group Affiliation, Listing Status, and Earnings Management: Evidence from Korea。Contemporary Accounting Research,23(2),427-464。  new window
14.葉銀華、邱顯比(19960800)。資本結構、股權結構與公司價值關聯性之實證研究:代理成本理論。臺大管理論叢,7(2),57-89。new window  延伸查詢new window
15.Stulz, René M.(1988)。Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control。Journal of Financial Economics,20(1/2),25-54。  new window
16.Pound, John(1988)。Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight。Journal of Financial Economics,20(1/2),237-265。  new window
17.Jensen, Michael C.、Ruback, Richard S.(1983)。The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence。Journal of Financial Economics,11(1-4),5-50。  new window
18.Baysinger, Barry D.、Butler, Henry N.(1985)。Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition。Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization,1(1),101-124。  new window
19.Hermalin, Benjamin E.、Weisbach, Michael S.(1991)。The Effect of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance。Financial Management,20(4),101-112。  new window
20.Jensen, Michael C.(1993)。The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems。The Journal of Finance,48(3),831-880。  new window
21.Shleifer, Andrei、Vishny, Robert W.(1997)。A survey of corporate governance。The Journal of Finance,52(2),737-783。  new window
22.Fan, Joseph P. H.、Wong, Tak-Jun(2002)。Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia。Journal of Accounting and Economics,33(3),401-425。  new window
23.Jensen, Michael C.、Meckling, William H.(1976)。Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure。Journal of Financial Economics,3(4),305-360。  new window
24.Donaldson, L.、Davis, J. H.(1991)。Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns。Australia Journal of Management,16,49-64。  new window
25.Fan, P. H.、Wong, T. J.(2002)。Corporate ownership structure and the information of accounting earnings in east Asia。Journal of Accounting and Economics,33,401-425。  new window
26.Fosberg R.H.(1989)。Outside directors and management raonitoring。Akron Business and Economic Review,20,24-32。  new window
27.Claessens, S.、Djankov, S.、Fan, J. P.、Lang, L. P.(2002)。Disentanging the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings。Journal of Finance,57,2741-2771。  new window
研究報告
1.Fuerst, O.、Kang, S. H.(2000)。Corporate governance, expected operating performance, and pricing。New Haven:Yale School of Management。  new window
2.Opler, T.、Sokobin, J.(1997)。Does coordinated institutional activism work? An analysis of the activities of the council of institutional investors。  new window
學位論文
1.張雅琳(2004)。我國企業獨立董事機制與經營績效之關聯性研究(碩士論文)。大葉大學。  延伸查詢new window
2.張明峰(1991)。股權結構對公司績效影響之研究(碩士論文)。國立政治大學。  延伸查詢new window
3.吳昆皇(1995)。上市公司董事會組成與特性對企業經營績效之關聯性研究(碩士論文)。國立臺灣大學。  延伸查詢new window
4.陳迪(2003)。董事會、監察人特性與公司績效關聯之再探討。國立政治大學。  延伸查詢new window
5.周真貞(1998)。董事長與總經理的傳承對企業經營績效之影響。國立中山大學。  延伸查詢new window
6.劉靜容(2002)。經理者股權與公司績效--內生轉換聯立方程模型分析。淡江大學。  延伸查詢new window
7.謝淑娟(1994)。以權益代理問題的觀點探討股權結構與公司經營績效之關係--以台灣上市公司實證。國立交通大學。  延伸查詢new window
圖書
1.Furst, O.、Kang, S. H.(1998)。Corporate governance, expected operating performance, and pricing。  new window
其他
1.Vance, S.(1995)。Inside or outside directors: Is there really a difference。  new window
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
:::
無相關書籍
 
無相關著作
 
QR Code
QRCODE