本文之研究，係以雷曼連動債的問題為出發點，嘗試就反向揭穿公司面紗原則與美國法相關案例之討論，作一個較深入且完整的分析，並藉由經濟分析的角度，反覆思考關係企業有限責任與資產分割所產生的問題。本文之研究顯示，反向揭穿公司面紗原則在美國的發展至今已約有八十多年的時間，惟美國各州與聯邦法院就反向揭穿公司面紗的適用呈現相當分歧的見解，且多數法院持否定態度；美國學者對此原則之適用亦十分保留。在反向揭穿公司面紗原則仍具有高度爭議性、案件事實特殊性與判斷標準模糊不確定的情形下，本文並未企圖主張我國應該引進該原則之適用。然而，國際與國內關係企業或集團企業因商業交易或侵權行為所產生的企業責任問題，已非傳統單一公司主體及自然人投資人思考下的法律制度所能規範，本文所研究的反向揭穿公司面紗原則，以及其他可能的替代方案，如代理理論、實質董事與企業責任等，應可就關係企業或集團企業所衍生的責任主體問題，提供若干有趣的思考方向，後續的相關發展與研究，仍值得吾人進一步的關注。

This paper uses the case of structured notes issued by Lehman Brother Co. as a starting point to study the principle of reverse piercing of corporate veil and its relevant cases developed in the United States. In addition, this paper will discuss such principle from the perspective of economic analysis and contemplate the issues regarding limited liability in corporate group and asset partitioning. This study shows that although the principle of reverse piercing of corporate veil has been developed for more than 80 years in the United States, the state and federal courts have substantial disagreement on its application, most courts and scholars are against such principle. This paper does not take the position to recommend such principle to be adopted in Taiwan since its application is still highly debated, fact-specific and its standards are ambiguous. However, we should pay more attentions to the issues of liabilities in corporate groups or affiliates arising out of domestic or international transactions and this paper, through studying the principle of reverse piercing of corporate veil and its possible alternatives, such as agency theory, director de facto or shadow director, and enterprise liability, shall shed some lights in this respect.