Famous anti-pornography feminists, Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby claim that pornography perpetrates upon women as ”illocutionary disablement”: it renders women incapable of performing certain acts (such as refusing and protesting) by speaking. Daniel Jacobson argues that if Langton and Hornsby are right, then there was no refusal at all; the strange and troubling consequence of Langton and Hornsby's argument, according to Jacobson, is that they cannot call this rape. He concludes that there is an absurd consequence to the claim that women have been illocutionarily disabled in this way, which can be taken as a reductio of the argument: it makes rape impossible in this hypothetical scenario. In this paper, I will argue that if Langton and Hornsby want to derive some powerful reasons for not allowing the publication of pornography from the argument, then they will be forced to accept the absurd consequence that they cannot call this rape. This means that Langton and Hornsby's argument is not cogent at all. In short, censorship is won for their argument only at the cost of coherence.