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來源文獻資料
摘要
外文摘要
引文資料
題名:
政治派系與制度變遷對大陸國家銀行貸款行為之影響--1995~2010年大陸各省銀行貸款的實證分析
書刊名:
東亞研究
作者:
趙學維
作者(外文):
Chao, Thomas Hsueh-wei
出版日期:
2014
卷期:
45:1
頁次:
頁45-88
主題關鍵詞:
派系政治
;
派系關係指標
;
銀行貸存比
;
財政轉移支付
;
中央地方關係
;
Factionalism
;
Factional ties
;
Loan-to-deposit ratio
;
Fiscal transfer payment
;
Central-local relations
原始連結:
連回原系統網址
相關次數:
被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
排除自我引用:0
共同引用:
19
點閱:73
本研究嘗試結合兩個關於中國財政與金融的分析模型。首先將史宗瀚(Victor Shih)設計的派系關係指標引進王紹光(Shaoguang Wang)對於大陸各省人均財政轉移支付的分析模型,探討1995~2010年間派系關係對於大陸各省人均財政轉移支付 的影響。接著將人均財政轉移支付納入史宗瀚對大陸各省國家銀行貸款額度的分析模型,結果發現:(一)各省領導人的派系關係確實會影響該省的人均財政轉移支付金額。在宏觀政策適度從緊的年份,具有非技術官僚派系關係的省份可以獲得較高額的人均財政轉移支付,和技術官僚有派系關係的省份獲得的人均財政轉移支付金額則較低;(二)在宏觀政策適度從緊的年份,獲得人均財政轉移支付金額愈高的省份,當年該省所獲得的國家銀行貸款額度就愈低;(三)在積極財政政策和經濟刺激計畫期間,具有非技術官僚派系關係的省份,由於已經透過派系關係爭取到更高額的財政轉移支付,因此獲得的國家銀行貸款額度要比沒有派系關係的省份還來得低。
以文找文
This paper aims to integrate two statistical models on Chinese financial politics. The first step is to incorporate the factional ties index designed by Victor Shih into a model on provincial transfer payment developed by Shaoguang Wang to investigate the impact of factions on the amount of transfer payment received by each province between 1995 and 2010. The next step is to introduce the provincial transfer payment variable into Victor Shih's model on provincial state bank loans in China during the same period. The major findings are: (1) The effect of factional ties' on the amount of transfer payment received by each province is most significant during an anti-inflationary policy period. Provinces with factional ties to the General Secretary and other non-technocratic leaders tend to receive higher amount of transfer payment while provinces with factional ties to the Premier and other technocratic leaders tend to receive lower amount of transfer payment. (2) During an anti-inflationary policy period, provinces with higher transfer payment tend to receive lower loans from the state banking system. (3) During a fiscal stimulus policy period, provinces with factional ties to the General Secretary and other non-technocratic leaders tend to receive lower loan-to-deposit ratio from the state banking system because these provinces already received higher transfer payment from the center that year.
以文找文
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延伸查詢
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趙學維、歐宏國(20081000)。地方談判籌碼的證據:對1980~2003年大陸各省投資行為的分析結果。社會科學論叢,2(2),2-61。
延伸查詢
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Walter, Carl E.、Howie, Fraser J. T.(2011)。Red Capitalism: The fragile financial foundation of China's extraordinary rise。John Wiley & Sons。
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延伸查詢
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Lee, Hong Yung(1991)。From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China。University of Calitornia Press。
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Huang, Yasheng(1996)。Inflation and investment Controls In China: The Political Economy of Central-Local relations During the Reform Era。Cambridge University Press。
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Shirk, Susan L.(1993)。The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China。University of California Press。
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吳敬璉(2005)。當代中國經濟改革:探索中國經濟順利轉型的秘密。美商麥格羅.希羅國際股份有限公司臺灣分公司。
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Zang, Xiaowei(2004)。Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China。Routledge:Curzon。
其他
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中國人民銀行條法司(1997)。關於改進國有商業銀行貸款規模管理的通知,http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/tiaofasi/584/1404/14042/14042_.html。
延伸查詢
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胡舒立(2012)。溫家寶爲何兩提《決議》,http://view.news.qq.eom/a/20120315/000014.htm, 2012/03/15。
延伸查詢
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張颯(2013)。監管層醞釀改進存貸比考核,上海。,http://www.ccstock.cn/finance/hongguanjingji/2013-01-31/A1060857.html。
延伸查詢
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賀靜萍(2013)。李克強出手整頓陸金融哀嚎。
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黃金老(20100521)。優化貸款限額控制的四項措施,http://blog.caijing.com.cn/expert_article-58-6500.shtml。
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圖書論文
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寇健文(2003)。中共菁英政治的研究途徑與發展。中國大陸研究方法與成果。台北:政治大學國際關係研究中心。
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Dittmer, Lowell、Wu, Yu-Shan(2006)。Leadership Coalitions and Economic Transformation in Reform China: Revisiting the Political Business Cycle。China's deep reform: Domestic politics in transition。Lanham, Maryland:Rowman & Littlefield Publishers。
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Shih, Victor C.、Qi Zhang(2007)。Who Receives Subsidies? A Look at the County Level in Two Time Periods。Paying for Progress in China: Public Finance, Human Welfare and Changing Patterns of Inequality。New York:Routledge。
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Wang, Shaoguang(2004)。For national unity: the political logic of fiscal transfer in China。Nationalism, Democracy and National Integration in China。New York:Routledge Curzon。
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陶儀芬(2002)。從「放權讓利」到「宏觀調控」--後鄧時代中央與地方金融關係的轉變。胡錦濤時代的挑戰。臺北:新新聞文化。
延伸查詢
6.
徐斯勤(2007)。中國大陸中央與各省關係中的水平性與垂直性權力競爭:菁英政治與投資政策的議題聯結分析。黨國蛻變:中共政權的精英與政策。臺北:五南圖書。
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