“Hide our light and bide our time” has been upheld as China’s foreign policy guideline for more than twenty years since it was outlined by Deng Xiaoping shortly after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. Given the dramatically increased economic and military clout supported by double-digit annual growth, it is no doubt that China is qualified as a major power with global influence. During the reign of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, whether China should amend Deng’s teaching and stress more on “to accomplish something,” or to maintain a low profile has been a fiercely debated issue. Nevertheless, Jiang’s willingness to assume “responsibilities” in his “great power diplomacy” and Hu’s “harmonious world” policy formula generally led China on a “status quo” track. This paper argues that policy disorder caused by territorial disputes in South and East China Seas and China’s unrefined “core interests” policy discourse, accompanied by the “rebalancing” and “pivot to Asia” strategies of America, gradually have led to China’s foreign policy change. To counterbalance Washington and its allies’ economic and military balancing and to redirect domestic discontent against inequality and corruption, the Xi-Li Administration will choose to actively assume the “responsibility” of being a great power, as prescribed by the 18th Party Congress Report. This time, however, the “responsibility” does not mean adherence to the established rules and order. Xi’s choice of his maiden foreign visit to Russia and South Africa (to attend the BRICS 5th Summit) and his speech are the best signs. Based on the hardcore idea of a “balance of power” and “The Third World,” Xi will be a candid and tough rival to the West, especially Japan and the United States.