2008年馬英九當選總統後兩岸關係趨向和緩，在相互合作的氣氛中，2010年6月，兩岸簽訂海峽兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ECFA）。這項協議被視為兩岸關係的重大進展。然而，3年後，作為ECFA後續協定的海峽兩岸服務貿易協議（CSSTA）卻遭受到了民間大量阻力而遲遲無法實行，還在2014年3月爆發了太陽花學運。太陽花學運可以說是反應出臺灣民意的變化。而同時，在2012年習近平上臺以後，中共的各項政策也都做了為幅不小的改變進而也影響中共對臺政策的優先性。本文以兩階段賽局（two-level games）為架構，分析民眾偏好的改變對該國政府外交政策的影響，及其政策應調整的方向。並以兩岸關係為例，說明當臺灣民眾及中國新領導人的政策偏好發生變化，而且變化的方向一致時，例如同時都更加重視臺灣的主權問題，此時兩岸間將可能爆發重大衝突。但是如果雙方所關注的焦點不同，雖然可能造成僵局或關係的倒退，但卻會是一個雙方都能滿意的結果。

On March 2014, the Sunflower Student Movement broke out in Taiwan in protest of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement（CSSTA）after the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement（ECFA）was signed just 4 years prior. The Sunflower Student Movement signified a shift of public opinion in Taiwan. Meanwhile, in 2012, Xi Jinping took the office as the new leader of Mainland China. In a different environment with new challenges, Xi has different policy priorities from his predecessor. In this paper, I employ a two-level game model to analyze how the change in Taiwan's public opinion indirectly influences Taiwan's diplomatic policy. I also use the cross- Strait relations as an example to illustrate that when Taiwan’s new public opinion and Mainland China's new leader both change in the same direction, for example, with Taiwan's sovereignty issue as a common focus, a big conflict may break out. However, if they do not share a common focus, even at the expense of cross-Strait relations deadlock or backtrack, both sides would be satisfied with a new situation.