巴迪烏於一九八零年代後期宣稱「哲學的回歸」，目的是在「哲學已死」的後現代喧嘩中重申哲學的主要性。巴迪烏運用兩種方式重申哲學主要性，一種是正面定義哲學所處理的議題與任務；另一種則以負面論辯形式，透過對非哲學立場（包括詭辯學與反哲學）的標記，重新思考現代哲學關於存有、主體與真理三大主軸。本文在巴迪烏真理哲學的背景下，以尼采的反哲學為經，大政治為緯，論述巴迪烏筆下尼采的特異性，其侷限與對哲學的啟發。論文分為三大區塊：第一部分討論劃界判準的分類問題；第二部分處理海德格與德勒茲對尼采的閱讀與巴迪烏對兩人的批判，藉此突顯巴迪烏閱讀上的介入性（非註釋性）之策略；第三部分闡述尼采作為反哲學家如何構思一種新的（反）哲學與（大）政治的關係，並佐以巴迪烏的真理哲學做對照。論文結論指出，雖然巴迪烏對尼采的評論都是在真理哲學的基礎上展開，但反哲學對哲學本身的定位仍有無可取代的意義，絕非是可有可無的附屬衍生品，也不是單純成就哲學回歸的次要範疇。巴迪烏強調，反哲學是哲學回歸與轉向不可或缺的形構性條件；哲學並非先於反哲學，事實上，「哲學永遠都是反哲學的繼承者」

In the late 1980s, Alain Badiou embarked on the project, ＂the (re)turn of philosophy,＂ to assert the primacy of philosophy amidst the postmodern brouhaha that had pronounced its death. To achieve this, Badiou adopted two approaches: first, a positive definition of philosophy, dealing with central issues and tasks faced by philosophy; second, negative polemics, demarcating the non-philosophical positions (including sophistics and antiphilosophy) in order to rethink the categories of being, subjectivity, and truth in modern philosophy. This paper examines the singular aspects of Nietzsche's anti-philosophy and great politics, exploring their contribution to the advent of philosophical modernity as well as the limitation it places on the development of contemporary philosophy. The paper is divided into three parts. The first discusses the question of demarcation; the second looks at Badiou's reading of Heidegger's and Deleuze's interpretations of Nietzsche; the final section elaborates on the relation of (anti)philosophy and (great) politics in Nietzsche from within the framework of Badiou's own philosophy of truth. In conclusion, I argue that although anti-philosophy is something to be overcome, it is not something philosophy can do without. In fact, antiphilosophy is constitutive of philosophy's (re)turn to itself. ＂Philosophy,＂ as Badiou puts it, ＂is always the heir to anti-philosophy.＂