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題名:The Determinants of Loan Impairment Recognized by the U.S. Bank Holding Companies
書刊名:會計評論
作者:劉順仁 引用關係
作者(外文):Liu, Shuen-zen
出版日期:1997
卷期:30
頁次:頁33-77
主題關鍵詞:放款壞帳損失訊息發放資本適足率管制Loan impairmentSignalingCapital adequacy ratio regulations
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(8) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:8
  • 共同引用共同引用:4
  • 點閱點閱:43
本文探討影響美國商業銀行經理人承認放款壞帳損失之因素。具體而言,可影響壞 帳費用、壞帳沖銷之種種因素皆於本文中探討。本文首先將銀行壞帳之承認區分成權衡性與 非權衡性兩種。其中權衡性之壞帳承認指經理人依照其自身利益所承認之壞帳數量,該數量 可正可負,不一定與放款品質相關;非權衡性之壞帳承認指經理人依照適當之會計準則,考 量客觀之經濟變數所應承認之壞帳數量。 本文利用美國 143 家銀行控股公司 1987-1990 之資料,以「似無相關迴歸」( Seemingly Unrelated Regression )進行統計分析,獲得以下主要結論:( 1 )自有資本比率較低銀 行之經理人可利用權衡性壞帳費用來告示資本市場該銀行真實之股價,並以之規避金融檢查 單位對該銀行自有資本比率過低之處分。此外,當銀行該年度獲利率偏低時,經理人傾向承 認較高之權衡性壞帳費用,以一次出清利空消息。 ( 2 )經理人利用權衡性壞帳沖銷以調 高其過低之自有資本比率。此外,銀行外聘之新任經理人傾向承認較高之權衡性壞帳沖銷。 ( 3 )就非權衡性壞帳損失而言,逾期放款之總數量與成長率為最重要之決定因素。
This paper examines how managerial incentives can affect financial rep ort recognition of loan impairments in the U.S. banking industry. Loan impairments consist of a discretionary and a non-discretionary component.This paper first examines various factors(e.g., signaling, capital adequacy ratio regulations, cost of equity, management change, income-smoothing, and big-bath) which may influence the discretionary loan loss provision decision. Then, the discretionary loan loss charge-off decision is hypothesized to be affected by the primary capital adequacy ratio regulation, tax-saving incentives, and management change. Exogenous variables which may affect the nondiscretionary loan loss provision and loan loss charge-off decisions(e.g., local, national, and international economic conditons)are controlled by also including them in the models of the loan loss provision and loan loss charge-off. The hypotheses developed in this paper are empirically tested using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression analysis for loan impairments recognized by 143 U.S. bank holding companies in the 1987-1990 period. The results support the signaling hypothesis and the primary capital adequacy ratio regulation hypothesis; in addition, the effects of senior management change, and the big-bath incentive are found to be important.
期刊論文
1.劉順仁(19951000)。On the Signaling Incentives of Loan Loss Provision Recognized by Banks。會計評論,29,223-255。new window  new window
2.Beaver, W. H.、Eger, C.、Ryan, S.、Wolfson, M. A.(1989)。Financial Reporting, Supplemental Disclosures, and Bank Share Prices。Journal of Accounting Research,27(2),157-178。  new window
3.Beatty, Anne、Chamberlain, Sandra L.、Magliolo, Joseph(1995)。Managing financial reports of commercial banks: The influence of taxes, regulatory capital, and earnings。Journal of Accounting Research,33(2),231-261。  new window
4.Collins, Julie H.、Shackelford, Douglas A.、Wahlen, James M.(1995)。Bank differences in the coordination of regulatory capital, earnings, and taxes。Journal of Accounting Research,33(2),263-291。  new window
5.Moyer, S. E.(1988)。Capital Adequacy Ratio Regulations and Accounting Choices in Commercial Banks。Journal of Accounting and Economics,13(2),123-154。  new window
6.Hand, J. R. M.(1989)。Did Firms Undertake Debt-Equity Swaps for An Accounting Paper Profit or True Financial Gain?。The Accounting Review,64(4),587-623。  new window
7.McNichols, M.、Wilson, G. P.(1988)。Evidence of Earnings Management from the Provision for Bad Debts。Journal of Accounting Research,26(Suppl.),1-31。  new window
8.Elliot, J. A.、Hanna, D.、Shaw, W. H.(1991)。The Evaluation by the Financial Markets of Changes in Bank Loan Loss Reserve Level。Accounting Review,66(4),847-859。  new window
9.Griffin, P.、Wallach, S.(1991)。Latin American Lending by Major Banks: the Effects of Disclosure about Non-accrual Loans and Loan Loss Provisions。Accounting Review,66(4),830-846。  new window
10.Musumeci, James J.、Sinkey, Joseph F.(1990)。The International Debt Crisis and Bank Loans-Loss-Reserve Decisions: The Signaling Content of Partially Anticipated Events。Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,1990(Aug.),370-386。  new window
11.Wahlen, J.(1994)。The Nature of Information in Commercial Bank Loan Loss Disclosures。Accounting Review,69(3),451-475。  new window
12.Bernstein, L. A.(1970)。Reserve for Future Costs and Losses: Threat to Integrity of the Income Statement。Financial Analysts Journal,1970(Jan./Feb.),147-152。  new window
13.Clair, R. T.(1990)。Performance of Eleventh District Banks in 1989: Progress but not Profits。Economic Review,1990(Sep.),15-23。  new window
14.Grinblatt, M.、Hwang, C.(1989)。Signaling and the Pricing of New Issues。Journal of Finance,1989(Jun.),59-77。  new window
15.Keeton, W.(1989)。The New Risk-Based Capital Plan for Commercial Banks。Economic Review,1989(Dec.),40-60。  new window
16.Ma, C. K.(1988)。Loan Loss Reserve and Income Smoothing: The Experience in the U. S. Banking Industry。Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,15(4),487-497。  new window
17.Poterba, J. M.(1991)。Comparing the Cost of Capital in the United States and Japan: A Survey of Methods。Quarterly Review,1991(Winter),20-32。  new window
18.Simons, K.(1990)。New England Banks and the Texas Experience。New England Economic Review,1990(Sep.),55-62。  new window
19.Strong, J.、Meyer, J.(1987)。Asset Writedowns: Management Incentives and Security Returns。Journal of Finance,1987(Jul.),643-64。  new window
20.Tannenwald, R.(1991)。Cyclical Swing or Secular Slide: Why Have New England's Banks Been Losing Money。New England Economic Review,1991(Nov.),29-46。  new window
21.Walter, J. R.(1991)。Loan Loss Reserve。Economic Review,1991(Jul.),20-30。  new window
22.Zimmer, S.、McCauley, A.(1991)。Cost of Capital for Banks in International Competition。Quarterly Review,1991(Winter),33-59。  new window
23.Leland, Hayne E.、Pyle, David H.、Brealey, Richard(1977)。Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation。The Journal of Finance,32(2),371-387。  new window
24.Scholes, Myron S.、Wilson, G. Peter、Wolfson, Mark A.(1990)。Tax Planning, Regulatory Capital Planning and Financial Reporting Strategy for Commercial Banks。The Review of Financial Studies,3(4),624-650。  new window
25.Healy, Paul M.(1985)。The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions。Journal of Accounting and Economics,7(1-3),85-107。  new window
26.DeAngelo, Harry、Skinner, Douglas J.、DeAngelo, Linda E.(1994)。Accounting choice in troubled companies。Journal of Accounting and Economics,17(1/2),113-143。  new window
研究報告
1.Holthausen, R. W.、Larcker, D. F.、Sloan, R. G.(1993)。Annual Bonus Schemes and the Manipulation of Earnings. Working。University of Pennsylvania。  new window
2.Liu, C.、Ryan, S.、Wahlen, J.(1994)。Differential Valuation Implications of Loan Loss Provisions across Banks and Fiscal Quarters。New York University。  new window
3.Liu, S. Z.、Bendingfield, J.、Chang, C. K.(1996)。An Empirical Study on Factors Influencing the Recognition of Loan Impairment by U. S. Commercial Banks。National Taiwan University。  new window
圖書
1.Judge, G. J.、Griffiths, W. E.、Hill, R. C.、Lutkepohl, H.、Lee, T. C.(1985)。The Theory and Practice of Econometrics。  new window
2.American Institute of Certified Public Accountants(1983)。Audits of Banks。New York:American Institute of Certified Public Accountants。  new window
3.American Institute of Certified Public Accountants(1986)。Auditing the Allowance for Credit Losses of Banks。New York:American Institute of Certified Public Accountants。  new window
4.Johnston, J.(1984)。Econometric Methods。New York, NY:McGraw-Hill Borh Company。  new window
其他
1.Liscio, R.(19871005)。What Has Citicorp Wrought?。  new window
 
 
 
 
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