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題名:成長機會與股票股利關係之實證研究--代理問題觀點
書刊名:管理與資訊學報
作者:闕河士 引用關係黃旭輝 引用關係
作者(外文):Chueh, HoraceHuang, Hsu-huei
出版日期:1997
卷期:2
頁次:頁133-148
主題關鍵詞:成長機會股票股利
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(4) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:4
  • 共同引用共同引用:15
  • 點閱點閱:31
     股票股利的發放一直是個令人關注的議題,過去解釋股票股利的理論包括,最適 交易價格理論、租稅選擇權理論,以及信號發射理論,這些理論雖然有其貢獻和實證的支持 ,但仍然存在著相當多的批評,因此本文嘗試從代理問題的觀點解釋股票股利的發放,由於 成長機會高的公司,面臨較高的資訊不對稱,而有較嚴重的代理問題,且股票股利的發放有 助於增加主管機關及機構投資人的外部監督,因此我們認為,成長機會高的公司較有可能透 過股票股利的發放,來減低其代理問題。本文分別以本益比及權益的市值與帳面價值比作為 公司成長機會的替代變數,實證發現成長機會高的公司其股票股利的發放率也較高,亦即支 持本文提出的假說:股票股利有助於降低代理問題,因而代理問題較大的高成長公司,會透 過股票股利的發放來降低其代理成本。
     The Purpose of This Paper Deals with Why Corporates Pay out Stock Divi dends from the Viewpoint of Agency theory. Companies Possessing Higher Growth Opportunities Always Face More Serious Asymmetric Information, Thus Higher Agency Cost. By the Payout of Stock Dividendds, Companies will Expose Themselves within t he Purview of the Competent Agency's Regulations and Institutional Investors' Supervision: Therefore, Leading to the Reduction of Agency Cost. We Employ Price Earnings Ratio and Market-To-Book Ratio as the proxy Varibles for corporate Growth to Support our Hypothesis. We Find That the Companies with Higher Growth Will Tend to Pay More Stock dividends to Reduce the Agency Cost.
期刊論文
1.Ohlson, J. A.、Penman, S. H.(1985)。Volatility Increases Subsequent to Stock Splits: An Empirical Aberration。Journal of Financial Economics,14(2),251-266。  new window
2.Gaver, Jennifer J.、Gaver, Kenneth M.(1995)。Compensation policy and the investment opportunity set。Financial Management,24(1),19-32。  new window
3.Foster, T. W.、Vickrey, D.(1978)。The Information Content of Stock Dividend。Announcements, Accounting Review,53(2),360-370。  new window
4.Grinblatt, Mark S.、Masulis, Ronald W.、Titman, Sheridan(1984)。The Valuation Effects of Stock Splits and Stock Dividends。Journal of Financial Economics,13(4),461-490。  new window
5.Oviatt, B. M.(1988)。Agency and transaction cost perspectives on the manager-shareholder relationship: Incentives for congruent interests。Academy of Management Review,13,214-225。  new window
6.Banker, R. D.、Das, S.、Datar, S. M.(1993)。Complementarity of Prior Accounting Information: the Cost of Stock Dividend Announcements。Accounting Review,68,28-47。  new window
7.Miller, M. H.、Modigliani, F.(1961)。Dividend policy, growth, and the value of share。Journal of Business,34,411-433。  new window
8.Brennan, M. J.、Copeland, T. E.(1988)。Stock Splits, Stock Prices and Transaction Costs。Journal of Financial Economics,22(1),83-101。  new window
9.Woolridge, J. R.(1983)。Stock dividends as signals。The Journal of Financial Research,6(1),1-12。  new window
10.Constantinides, G.(1984)。Optimal Stock Trading with Personal Taxes: Implications for Prices and the Abnormal January Returns。Journal of Financial Economics,13,65-89。  new window
11.黃慶堂、張文惠(19950100)。股利宣告的資訊內涵差異性之探討。證券市場發展季刊,7(1)=25,27-61。new window  延伸查詢new window
12.Liljeblom, E.(1989)。The Informational Impact of Announcements of Stock Dividends and Stock Splits。Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,16,681-697。  new window
13.Gompers, P. A.(1995)。Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture capital。Journal of Finance,50(5),1461-1489。  new window
14.Gaver, Jennifer J.、Gaver, Kenneth M.(1993)。Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies。Journal of Accounting and Economics,16(1-3),125-160。  new window
15.Myers, Stewart C.(1977)。Determinants of Corporate Borrowing。Journal of Financial Economics,5(2),147-175。  new window
16.Smith, Clifford W. Jr.、Watts, Ross L.(1992)。The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies。Journal of Financial Economics,32(3),263-292。  new window
17.Lewellen, Wilbur、Loderer, Claudio、Martin, Kenneth(1987)。Executive compensation contracts and executive incentive problems: An empirical analysis。Journal of Accounting and Economics,9(3),287-310。  new window
18.Fama, Eugene F.、Fisher, Lawrence、Jensen, Michael C.、Roll, Richard J.(1969)。The adjustment of stock prices to new information。International Economic Review,10(1),1-21。  new window
19.Jensen, Michael C.、Meckling, William H.(1976)。Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure。Journal of Financial Economics,3(4),305-360。  new window
20.Ross, S. A.(1977)。The determination of financial structure: The incentive signalling approach。Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,8,177-183。  new window
21.Moyer, R. C.、Chatfield, R. E.、Sisneros, P. M.(1989)。Security analysts monitoring activity: Agency costs and information demands。Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1989(Dec.),503-512。  new window
研究報告
1.Foster, T. W. III、Scribner, E. A.(1991)。A Reexamination or Stock Distributions Controlling for Nonstationarity of Systematic Risk。University of Nebraska-Lincoln。  new window
學位論文
1.蔡秀玫(1994)。股票股利對交易量影響之研究(碩士論文)。國立臺灣大學。  延伸查詢new window
2.闕河士(1996)。股票股利信號發射模式與宣告效果之研究(博士論文)。國立政治大學。new window  延伸查詢new window
3.王雪花(1994)。股票股利與股價關聯性之研究(碩士論文)。國立臺灣大學。  延伸查詢new window
4.李建然(1991)。台灣上市公司股票股利與股票價格變動關係之研究(碩士論文)。政治大學。  延伸查詢new window
5.Klein, L. S.(1987)。Earnings Information Content of Stock Dividend and Split Announcement(博士論文)。Florida State University。  new window
6.Peterson, C. A.(1992)。Financial Signaling with Stock Splits and Stock Dividends(博士論文)。University of Arkansas。  new window
單篇論文
1.Kole, S.(1994)。The Bundling of Compensation Plan,University of Rochester。  new window
 
 
 
 
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