當今歐洲整理論的主流 — 自由派政府間主義，一方面肯定歐洲整合的重要性 ，一方面堅持區域組織沒有自主性，對會員國的行為影響有限。根據政府間主義，要解釋 歐洲整合，最重要的因素是會員國自身的利益，而包括國內以及國際兩個層次的二重賽局 理論則提供一個最好的分析模型。本文利用民主赤字嚴重的會員國間移民政策的協調說明 ，該理論模型與歐盟的實際運作並不相符。本研究顯示，歐盟架構中的組織制度及其中的 行為者對政策結果的影響力，遠超出會員國國內行為者對政策結果之影響力。 。

　　　　　This article compares the decision-making process in the area of coordinated migration policies within the EU and the decision-making pattern liberal intergovernmentalists have posited under the two-level games model. While the two-level games model requires a strong democratic control mechanism, the decision-making in the area of coordinated migration policies is characterized by the so-called "democratic deficits." The serious problem of the democratic deficits provides strong evidence for the missing link between the interests-formation in pluralist societies on the one hand, and intergovernmental negotiations on the other. Contrary to the model formulated by intergovernmentalists and confirming neo-functionalist conviction, decision-making in this area bears strong supranational idiosyncrasies. Intergovernmentalists have obviously underestimated the importance of elites and technocrats in shaping policy outcomes.