基于隱性激勵的視角,本文考察了高管晉升預期對其自定薪酬以及高管與員工薪酬差距的影響。研究發現,晉升預期與薪酬差距顯著負相關,晉升預期高時,高管會傾向于領取低薪酬,縮小薪酬差距。同時,不同晉升預期類型對高管行為影響有所差異。相對于集團內部晉升預期,政治晉升預期對薪酬差距的抑制作用更大。而且,晉升預期的行政級別越高,高管薪酬越低,對薪酬差距的抑制效果越明顯。進一步研究發現,晉升預期雖然降低了高管薪酬、縮小了薪酬差距,但并未緩解股東與管理層之間的代理問題,也未能激勵高管創造更好的業績。本文從隱性激勵視角對高管"零薪酬"現象進行了解釋,為進一步完善薪酬激勵機制提供了經驗證據。

In this paper,we test the effects of executives’ promotion expectation on compensation and the pay gap between executives and employees in China.We measure the promotion expectation of current executives by using their predecessors’ promotion ranks and direction. We find that there is a significantly negative relationship between promotion expectation and the pay gap,suggesting that senior executives with stronger expectation of political promotion are more willing to accept less compensation and therefore a smaller pay gap. Furthermore,we find that different types of promotion expectation have different effects on senior executives’ perceptions. Compared with intra-group promotion,political promotion expectation has greater effects on limiting executive compensation and narrowing the pay gap. However,we find that promotion expectation fails to mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and managers and further motivates the executives to maximise firm value.