臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫系統

:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
第 1 筆 / 總合 1 筆   第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁
/1頁
題名：私募股權對公司經營績效之影響－兼論核心代理問題及公司治理之角色
作者：何威德 引用關係
作者(外文)：Wei-TeHo
校院名稱：國立成功大學
系所名稱：會計學系碩博士班
指導教授：李宏志
賴秀卿
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2012
主題關鍵詞：私募；經營績效；私募應募人；核心代理問題；公司治理；Private placement of equity；Operating performance；Private placement investors；Central agency problem；Corporate governance
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(1) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:1
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:123
本研究主要探討公司私募股權後之經營績效並考量核心代理問題、董事會結構及外部監督機制之影響。實證結果顯示，私募股權公司因私募後營收成長而顯著地改善其經營績效。對於內部人參與之私募，因其對公司實際營運情況較為瞭解，可降低資訊不對稱，而私募後營收的增加亦帶來經營績效的提升。此外，私募股權公司不論是折價或溢價發行，私募後經營績效均有顯著的改善或提升，其中私募折價是為了傳達未來經營績效將會有所改善，而溢價發行則是為了傳遞經營績效將會持續成長。本研究亦發現，私募前虧損公司其私募後經營績效有顯著的改善，然而私募前獲利公司則未能有效的提升。最後，不論公司是以溢價或折價發行股票或私募前虧損公司，內部人之參與均可提升或改善其私募後之經營績效。有關核心代理問題、董事會結構與外部監督機制影響之探討，實證結果顯示核心代理問題下，誘因效果對於整體私募股權公司、溢價發行或折價發行公司、私募前虧損公司及內部人參與之私募前虧損公司其私募期間之經營績效均有正向的影響，然而侵占效果則不利於私募前獲利公司之經營績效。而對於消極投資人參與之私募公司則因最終控制股東為控制家族而加深了侵占效果之負面影響。董事會結構中，折價發行公司會因最終控制股東為控制家族而加深了私募期間董監事股權質押比率對於經營績效不利的影響。私募期間若獨立董監事比例增加，則因監督效果之提升，而有助於整體私募公司、內部人參與之私募公司及內部人參與私募前獲利公司之經營績效。此外，四大會計師事務所為維持其聲譽資本而增加對公司之監督，因此對整體私募公司、溢價發行公司及內部人參與私募前獲利公司其經營績效帶來正面的影響。額外測試顯示，即使內部人參與之私募折價大於20%，並不會損害公司股東之權益。因此，本研究實證結果肯定證券主管機關修法限制最近年度為稅後純益且無累積虧損之公司，除特定情況外，原則上不得以私募作為籌措資金途徑之規定，亦支持證券主管機關強調私募公司應落實公司治理之主張。
This study mainly examines the impact of private placement of equity on the operating performance by considering the influence of central agency problem and corporate governance. We find that private equity offering firms had better improvement in operating performance than seasoned equity offering firms subsequent to the year of issue. Among private placement investors, insiders are familiar with the firm and are in a better position to resolve asymmetric information, so they can help firm improve the operating performance. We also find that private equity offering firms issuing at premium and discount price had better post-placement operating performance, which results from that the private equity discount may inform better operating performance in the future and the premium may reflect better future sales growing opportunities. Furthermore, we find that the firms with losses prior to equity issue have significantly improved the operating performance, but the ones with profits do not. In addition, when the private placement investors are insiders, firms have better post-placement operating performance regardless of firms issuing at premiums, issuing at discounts, or with financial distress prior to the issue, but not for the case when firms with profits prior to the private placement. About the effect of central agency problem, board of structure and external monitoring mechanism, we find the incentive effect can improve the operating performance of firms of all private placement, issuing at premiums, issuing at discounts, with financial distress prior to the issue, or the insider investor involving with financial distress prior to the issue, but for the passive investor the operating performance decline due to the deviation of control from cash-flow right by controlling family. The results also show that the operating performance of private equity offering firms issuing at discount decline due to the degree of collateralization of the stock held by the controlling family. In addition, the increase appointment of independent directors improve the operating performance of the firms of all private placement, insider investor, or insider investor involving with profits prior to the issue. We also find the Big 4 CPA firms can improve the operating performance of the firms of all private placement, insider investor, or insider investor having profits prior to the issue. Additional test shows that insiders cannot reduce shareholder wealth even if the price discount is over 20% per share for privately placed equity. Our results support the regulations about the limitations of insiders participating in the use of the private placement to issue for a public firm with a net profit and no accumulated deficit for the most recent fiscal year, and emphasize the importance of corporate governance.
中文部分
包幸玉，2010，公開發行公司辦理私募有價證券應注意事項簡介，證券暨期貨月刊，第28卷第12期：22-32。
金成隆、林修葳與黃書楣，2000，國內現金增資企業盈餘管理之實證研究，中山管理評論，第8 卷第4 期： 709-744 。
林宛瑩、汪瑞芝與游順合，2012，研發支出、內部董事與經營績效，會計審計論叢，第2卷第1期：61-90。
林嬋娟與張哲嘉，2009，董監事異常變動、家族企業與企業舞弊之關聯性，會計評論，第48期(1月)：1-33。
高蘭芬與邱正仁，2002，董監事股權質押對會計盈餘與股票報酬相關性之影響，臺大管理論叢，第13卷第1期：127-162。
許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩與鄭桂蕙，2003，控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量-上，貨幣觀測與信用評等，第42期（7月）：15-31。
許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩與鄭桂蕙，2003，控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量-下，貨幣觀測與信用評等，第43期（9月）：11-26。
張琬喻、蔡明秀與郭一帆，2010，股權私募宣告效果與股權結構變動—以台灣上市上櫃公司為例，財務金融學刊，第18卷第1期（3月）：91-136。
張瑞當、沈文華與黃怡翔，2011，宣告效果、股價報酬與盈餘管理：我國企業私募股權之研究，中華會計學刊，第7期（1月）：21-62。
張瑞當、方俊儒與曾玉琦，2007，核心代理問題與盈餘管理：董事會結構與外部監督機制之探討，管理學報，第24卷第1期：17-39。
黃志仁、廖彩伶與陳于格，2009，現金增資之盈餘管理行為：裁決性應計項目與業外損益之整合性決策，當代會計，第10卷第1期（5月）：63-98。
陳俊合、羅國華與王馨晨，2009，內部人認購、公司治理結構與私募股權折價，證券市場發展季刊，第21卷第2期：119-150。
葉銀華，2002，台灣公司治理的問題與改革之道，證券暨期貨管理，第20卷第11期：1-16。
葉銀華、李存修與柯承恩，2002，公司治理與評等系統，台北：商智文化出版。
楊朝旭，吳幸蓁，2003，總經理薪酬績效敏感性、績效門檻與盈餘管理關聯性之研究，會計評論，第36期：55-87。
歐進士，1998，我國企業研究發展與經營績效關聯性之實證研究，中山管理評論，第6卷第2期：357-386。
廖秀梅、李建然與吳祥華，2006，董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究－兼論台灣家族企業因素的影響，東吳經濟商學學報，第54期：117-160。
蕭巧玲，2010，強化公開發行公司辦理私募有價證券監理措施，證券暨期貨月刊，第28卷第12期：6-21。

英文部分
Anderson, R. C. and D. M. Reeb. 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance：Evidence from the S ＆ P 500. Journal of Finance 58: 1301-1328.
Barber, B. M. and J. D. Lyon. 1996. Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics 41(3): 359-399.
Barclay, M. J., C. G. Holderness, and D. P. Sheehan. 2001. The block pricing puzzle. Working paper.
Barclay, M. J., C. G. Holderness, and D. P. Sheehan. 2007. Private placements and managerial entrenchment. Journal of Corporate Finance 13 (4): 461-484.
Bathala, C. T., K. P. Moon, and R. P. Rao. 1994. Managerial ownership, debt policy, and the impact of institutional holdings: An agency theory perspective. Financial Management 23: 38-50.
Bathala, C. T. and S. J. Carson. 1995. The 1986 tax reform tax act and strategic leverage decisions. Journal of Financial and Strategic Decisions 8 (2): 57–63.
Becker, C. L., M. L. Defond, J. Jiambalvo, and K. R. Subramanyam. 1998. The effect of audit quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research 15(1): 1-24
Black, B. S. 1992. Institutional investors and corporate governance: the case for institutional voice. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 5: 19-32.
Brazel, J. F. and L. Dang. 2008. The effect of ERP system implementations on the management of earnings and earnings release dates. Journal of Information Systems 22 (2): 1-21.
Brous, P. 1992. Common stock offerings and earnings expectation: a test of the release of unfavorable information. Journal of Finance 47: 1517-1536.
Bushee, B. J. 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R＆D investment behavior. The Accounting Review 73(3): 305-333.
Cassell, C., G. Giroux, L. Myers, and T. Omer. 2007. The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the relation between the strength of corporate governance and auditor-client alignments. Texas A＆M University, Working paper.
Chen, C. and J. Lee. 1995. Accounting measures of business performance and Tobin’s q theory. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 10 (3): 587-607.
Chen, S. S., K. W. Ho, C. F. Lee, and G. H. H. Yeo. 2002. Long-run stock performance of equity-issuing firms: The case of private placements in Singapore. Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 5(3): 417-438.
Chen, A. S., Y. L. Cheng, and K. F. Cheng. 2010. Earnings management, market discounts and the performance equity placements. Journal of Banking and Finance 34: 1922-1932.
Chen, Y. R. and C. Y. Ho. 2009. The impact of family control and board characteristics on corporate policies. Journal of Management 26(1): 1-16.
Chu, S. M., G. H. Lentz, and E. Robak. 2005. Comparing the characteristics and performance of private equity offering firms with seasoned equity offering firms. Journal of Economics and Management 1 (1): 57-83.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and H. P. Lang. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58(1/2): 81-112.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. P. H. Fan, and L. H. P. Lang. 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholders. Journal of Finance 57(6): 2741-2771.
Coles, J. L., N. D. Daniel, and L. Naveen. 2008. Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics 87 (2): 329-356.
Cotter, J., A. Shivdasain, and M. Zenner. 1997. Do independent director enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers? Journal of Financial Economics 43(2): 195-218.
Cronqvist, H. and M. Nilsson. 2005. The choice between rights offerings and private equity placements. Journal of Financial Economics 78 (2): 375-407.
Davis, J., E. D. Schoorman, and L. Donaldson. 1997. Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy of Management Review 22: 20-47.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeny. 1995. Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review 70 (2): 193-225.
Fan, P. H. and T. J. Wong. 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the information of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33: 401-425.
Haw, I. M., B. Hu, L. S. Hwang, and W. Wu. 2004. Ultimate ownership, income management, and legal and extra-legal institutions. Journal of Accounting Research, 42(2): 423-462.
Hertzel, M. and R. L. Smith. 1993. Market discounts and shareholder gains for placing equity privately. Journal of Finance 48 (2): 459-485.
Hertzel, M. and L. Rees. 1998. Earnings and risk changes around private placements of equity. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 13: 21-35.
Hertzel, M., M. Lemmon, J.S. Linck, and L. Rees. 2002. Long-run performance following private placements of equity. Journal of Finance 57: 2595–2617.
Jain, P. 1992. Equity issues and changes in expectations of earnings by financial analysts. The Review of Financial Studies 5 (4): 669-683.
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360.
Jensen, M. C. and R. S. Ruback. 1983. Market for corporate control: empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 1: 5-50.
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit and failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance 48: 831-880.
Johnson, S., P. Boone, A. Breach, and E. Friedman. 2000. Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 58(1/2): 141-186.
Kim, Y., and M. S. Park. 2005. Pricing of seasoned equity offers and earnings management. Journal of Finαncial and Quantitative Analysis 40 (2): 435-463.
Krishnamurthy, S., P. Spindt, V. Subramaniam, and T. Woidtke. 2005. Does investor identity matter in equity issues? Evidence from private placements. Journal of Financial Intermediation 14 (2): 210-238.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 1999. Corporate Ownership around the World. Journal of Finance 54(2): 471-518.
La Porta R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 2002. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation. Journal of Finance 57 (3): 1147-1170.
Lee, H. W. and C. Kocher. 2001. Firm characteristics and seasoned equity issuance method: private placement versus public offering. The Journal of Applied Business Research 17(3): 23-36.
Lee, J. 2004. The effects of family ownership and management on firm performance. S.A.M Advanced Management Journal 69(4): 46-53.
Loughran, T. and J. R. Ritter. 1997. The operating performance of firms conducting seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Finance 52: 1823–1850.
McLaughlin R., A. Safieddine, and G. K. Vasudevan. 1996. The operating performance of seasoned equity issuers: Free cash flow and post-issue performance. Financial Management 25: 41-54.
Mehran, H. 1995. Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 38 (2): 163-184.
Myers, S. C. and N. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13 : 187–221.
Paskelian, O. G. and S. Bell. 2010. The market and operating performance of Chinese seasoned equity offerings. Applied Financial Economics 20: 649-657.
Rangan, S. 1998. Earnings management and the performance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics 50 (1): 101-122.
Seetharaman, A., L. S. Zane, and S. Bin. 2001. Analytical and empirical evidence of the impact of tax rates on the trade-off between debt and managerial ownership. Journal of Accounting, Auditing ＆ Finance 16: 249-272.
Shivakumar, L. 2000. Do firms mislead investors by overstating earnings before seasoned equity offerings? Journal of Accounting and Economics 29 (3): 339-371.
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52: 117-142.
Srinidhi, B., F. A. Gul, and J. Tsui. 2011. Female Directors and Earnings Quality. Contemporary Accounting Research 28(5): 1610-1644.
Tan, R. S. K., P. L. Cheng, and Y. H. Tong. 2002. Private placements and rights issues in Singapore. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 10(1): 29-54.
Teoh, S. H. and T. J.Wong. 1993. Perceived auditor quality and the earnings response coefficient. The Accounting Review 68(2): 346-366.
Teoh, S. H., Ivo Welch, and T. J.Wong. 1998. Earnings management and the underperformance of seasonal equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics 50: 63-99.
Wruck, K. H. 1989. Equity ownership concentration and firm value: Evidence from private equity financings. Journal of Financial Economics 23 (1): 3-28.
Wruck, K. H. and Y. Wu. 2009. Relationships, corporate governance, and performance: Evidence from private placements of common stock. Journal of Corporate Finance 15 (1): 30-47.
Wu, Y. 2004. The choice of equity-selling mechanisms. Journal of Financial Economics 74(1): 93-119.
Yeh, Y. H., T. S. Lee, and T. Woidtke. 2001. Family control and corporate governance: evidence from Taiwan. International Review of Finance 2: 21-48.
Yeh, Y. H., C. E. Ko, and Y. H. Su. 2003. Ultimate control and expropriation of minority shareholders: new evidence from Taiwan. Academia Economic Papers 31 (3): 263-299.
Yeh, Y. H. and T. Woidtke. 2005. Commitment or entrenchment? : controlling shareholders and board composition. Journal of Banking and Finance 29: 1857-1885.
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40: 185-212.

 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
:::
無相關書籍
 
無相關著作
 
無相關點閱
 
QR Code
QRCODE

臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫

目前上線人數：377（臺灣：369，外國：8） ／ 本年度總使用人次：1780212 ／ 訪客人次（自102年09月）：67585455
國家圖書館著作權聲明 Copyright © 2013 All rights reserved.
本館地址: 100201臺北市中山南路20號． 本館地圖及交通資訊．
總機：(02)23619132．最佳瀏覽解析度為1024x768以上