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題名：從「權力授予」概念看臺灣的行政立法互動關係：以八十七年預算法修正為例
書刊名：空大行政學報
作者：陳敦源 引用關係／徐仁輝
作者(外文)：Chen, Don-yun／Hsu, Jen-hui
出版日期：2000
卷期：10
頁次：頁155-186
主題關鍵詞：權力授予；行政立法關係；代理人理論；預算法；國會改革；Delegation of power；Executive-legislative relations；Agency theory；Budget act；Congressional reform
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(6) 博士論文(1) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
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  • 點閱點閱:38
　　　　　「權力授予」(delegationofpower)是任何民主憲政體制所共有的現象，也是行憲歷程中行政立法互動的核'心;然而，我國面對重大政策爭議時，不是為「內閣制vs總統制，軌優孰劣?」的問題所掩蓋、就是執迷在「專業決策」民主決策，軌重孰鏈?」的泥沼中，一方面造成我們習慣性地尋找修憲途徑來解決政策爭議，另一方也不斷以專業真理來對抗民主決策中的民粹要素，這兩種解決政策爭議的直覺反應，對於吾國憲政體制的實質發展並與助益。本文試圖從「權力授予」的角度，重新檢視我國行政立法關係運作的內涵，並以民國87年預算法修正為例，展現我國民主化進程中，有關榷力授予制度變遷的實況，以期建立觀察台灣未來行政立法關係各項制度發展的核心理論。 本文首先由引介新制度經濟學的「代理人」理論(agencytheory)出發，指出一一般行政立法關係制度選擇所要面對約三項重要問題： (1)多重代理人、(2)多重委託人與(3)不對稱的制衡關係。按著，本文再以代理人理論為核心，討論我國行政立法授權關係制度選擇的邏輯，並從中發掘解釋我國行政立法關係發展的關鍵因素：由行政權獨佔的現實與一黨獨大的矛盾所產生的「不行動假定」(inactionhypothesis)的問題，行政機關在行政立法的授權關係上，除非必要時刻，維持現狀是獲致權力極大化的主要策略，這是我國目前行政立法制度運作的特性;最後，我們從最近一次預算法修正的過程中，首先簡述吾國預算法結構變遷的歷史，並依據上述理論對此次的修正提出分析，讓理論於實例中得到印證;在結論中，我們提出從權力授予觀點出發的國會改革建議。
　　　　　"Delegation of power" is at the heart of every constitutional democracy. The idea isalso the essence of executive-legislative relations in any democratic polity. In Taiwan,discussion related to this concept is rarely seen. As a result, when we face an importantpolicy debate, we usually consider it to be caused either by the failure of our semipresidential system, or by the conflict between professionalism and populism in theprocess of public decision-making. In fact, most policy conflicts between executive andlegislative branches can be seen as the legislators reconsider their power-delegating activities to the executive. In this paper, we use the agency theory from the newinstitutional economics in particular to reveal the Taiwan's executive-legislative relationsfrom the "delegation of power" perspective. According to these theories, we first point out three problems to be solved in theexecutive delegation relations: (1) multiple agents; (2) multiple principals; (3)asymmetric check-and-balance relations. Then, we establish an "inaction hypothesis" which infers thatin general the executive can maximize its power in the executivelegislative relations by holding the status quo. It can be used to examine individual eventconcerning executive-legislative relations on Taiwan. By using 1998 Budget Act reformas an example, we demonstrate the inner logic of our executive-legislative interactions.Finally, we rethink three conceptual issues concerning the problems of congressionalreform from the "delegation of power" perspective.
期刊論文
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5.Macey, J. R.(1992)。Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War over Administrative Agencies。The Georgetown Law Journal，80，671-703。  new window
6.Weingast, Barry R.(1984)。The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective (with Applications to the SEC)。Public Choice，44(1)，147-191。  new window
7.Weingast, Barry R.、Moran, Mark J.(1983)。Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission。Journal of Political Economy，91(5)，765-800。  new window
8.McCubbins, Mathew D.、Noll, Roger G.、Weingast, Barry R.(1987)。Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control。Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization，3(2)，243-277。  new window
9.Waterman, Richard W.、Meier, Kenneth J.(1998)。Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?。Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory，8(2)，173-202。  new window
10.徐仁輝(1995)。制度經濟學的緣起與發展。中國行政評論，4(3)，105-126。  延伸查詢new window
11.黃秀端(19970900)。提升議事效率與立法品質應從基本制度開始改革。全國律師，1(9)，13-15。  延伸查詢new window
12.劉淑惠(1996)。充滿政治角力的議事亂象。國家政策雙週刊，142。  延伸查詢new window
13.Bendor, Jonathan、Moe, Terry M.(1985)。An Adoptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics。The American Political Science Review，79(3)，755-774。  new window
14.Bozeman, B.、Straussman, J. D.(1982)。Shrinking Budgets and the Shrinkage of Budget Theory。Public Administration Review，1982(Nov./Dec.)，509-515。  new window
15.Calvert, Randall L.、Weingast, Barry R.(1982)。Runaway Bureaucracy and Congressional Oversight: Why Reforms Fail?。Policy Studies Review，1(3)，557-564。  new window
16.Chen, Don-Yun、Huang, Tong-yi(1999)。Divided government: A new approach to Taiwan's local politics。Issues & Studies，35(1)，1-35。  new window
17.Fiorina, Morris P.(1982)。Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?。Public Choice，39(1)，33-66。  new window
18.Fiorina, Morris P.(1986)。Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power。Journal of Law, Economics and Organization，2(1)，33-51。  new window
19.Huber, John D.、Powell, G. Bingham Jr.(1994)。Congruence Between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy。World Politics，40(3)，291-326。  new window
20.Olsen, David(1995)。Feature: Parliament by Design: Organizational Dilemmas of Postcommunist Assemblies。East European Constitutional Review，4(2)，56-60。  new window
21.Waterman, Richard W.、Rouse, Amelia、Wright, Robert(1998)。The Venues of Influence: A New Theory of Political Control of the Bureaucracy。Journal of Public Administration: Research and Theory，8(1)，13-38。  new window
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25.石素梅(19981100)。預算法研修及審議經過。主計月報，86(5)=515，13-40。  延伸查詢new window
26.張哲琛(19930100)。預算法修正之經過情形及內容重點。主計月報，75(1)=445，15-25。  延伸查詢new window
27.廖益興(19960723)。國會「亂源」:選舉制度的缺陷。國家政策雙周刊，143，4-5。  延伸查詢new window
28.徐仁輝(19951000)。新制度經濟學與公共行政。世界新聞傳播學院學報，5，273-288。  延伸查詢new window
29.Moe, Terry M.(1984)。The New Economics of Organization。American Journal of Political Science，28(4)，739-777。  new window
30.McCubbins, Mathew D.、Schwartz, Thomas(1984)。Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms。American Journal of Political Science，28(1)，165-179。  new window
會議論文
1.林佳龍(1998)。半總統制、多黨體制與民主政體：台灣憲政衝突的制度分析。政治制度：理論與現實研討會。台北：中央研究院。  延伸查詢new window
2.林繼文(1998)。半總統制下的三角政治均衡。「政治制度：理論與現實」學術研討會，中央研究院主辦 (會議日期: 1998/06/25-26)。台北：中央研究院。  延伸查詢new window
3.陳敦源(1998)。領導在憲政選擇過程中的穩定功能：比較西班牙(1975-1978)與台灣(1988-1996)經驗。政治制度：理論與現實研討會。台北：中央研究院。  延伸查詢new window
學位論文
1.Hsu, Jen-Hui(1994)。Institutions and Bureaucratic Behavior in Budgeting--The Case of Taiwan(博士論文)。University of Southern California。  new window
圖書
1.Wildavsky, Aaron(1988)。The New Politics of the Budgetary Process。Scott, Foresman and Company。  new window
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7.羅傳賢(1997)。行政程序法基礎理論。臺北市：五南。  延伸查詢new window
8.Dahl, Robert Alan(1989)。Democracy and Its Critics。New Haven：Yale University Press。  new window
9.林嘉誠(1992)。民主制度設計。台北：業強。  延伸查詢new window
10.彭樹勛(1986)。中華民國行憲以來之立法院。台北：成文出版公司。  延伸查詢new window
11.楊明(1998)。無私的愛：柯媽媽的故事。台北：中央日報。  延伸查詢new window
12.顏明聖、李炳南(1999)。國會改革方案之理論與實際。台北：揚智文化。  延伸查詢new window
13.Aberbach, Joel D.(1990)。Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight。Washington, D.C：The Brookings Institution。  new window
14.Bohman, James、Rehg, William(1997)。Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics。Cambridge, Mass.：MIT Press。  new window
15.Sait, Edward McChesney(1938)。Political Institutions: A Preface。New York：D. Appleton-Century Company。  new window
16.Steinmo, S.、Thelen, K.、Longstreth, F.(1992)。Structuring Politics: historical Institutionalism in a Comparative Perspective。New York：Cambridge University Press。  new window
17.蕭公權(1982)。憲政與民主。臺北：聯經公司。  延伸查詢new window
18.Epstein, David、O'Halloran, Sharyn(1999)。Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers。Cambridge University Press。  new window
19.Horn, Murry J.(1995)。The Political Economy of Public Administration。Cambridge University Press。  new window
20.Fiorina, Morris P.(1996)。Divided Government。Boston：Allyn and Bacon。  new window
21.Stillman, R. J. II(1991)。Preface to Public Administration: A Search for Themes and Direction。New York：St. Martin's Press。  new window
22.Elster, Jon(1998)。Deliberative Democracy。Cambridge University Press。  new window
圖書論文
1.Lowi, T. J.(1993)。Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism, and Administrative Power。A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society。Chicago：The University of Chicago Press。  new window
2.Fiorina, M. P.(1979)。Control of the Bureaucracy: A Mismatch of Incentives and Capabilities。The Presidency and Congress: A Shifting Balance。Austin, TX：LBJ School of Public Affairs。  new window
3.陳敦源(1998)。跨域管理：部際與府際關係。公共管理。台北：商鼎。  延伸查詢new window
4.劉淑惠(1997)。立法院議事過程的變遷：政治民主化的影響。現代國家與憲法--李鴻禧教授六秩華誕祝賀論文集。台北：月旦。  延伸查詢new window
5.Arrow, Kenneth J.(1985)。The Economics of Agency。Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business。Boston：Harvard Business School Press。  new window
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7.Dahl, Robert A.(1997)。A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus Citizen Participation。Toward Democracy: A Journey。Berkeley：Institute of Governmental Studies Press。  new window
8.Huntington, Samuel(1965)。Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century。The Congress and America's Future。Prentice-Hall。  new window
9.LeLoup, L. T.(1988)。From Micro-budgeting to Macro-budgeting: Evolution in Theory and Practice。New Directions in Budget Theory。Albany, N.Y.：SUNY Press。  new window
10.Moe, Terry M.(1990)。The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy。Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond。Oxford：Oxford University Press。  new window
11.Weingast, Barry R.(1993)。Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives。A New Handbook of Political Science。New York：Oxford University Press。  new window
 
 
 
 
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