本文通過對大量檔案文獻及回憶史料的梳理和分析，講述了中朝關係中一些鮮為人知的重要史實：直到聯合國軍越過三八線之前，朝鮮領導人對於中國提供直接軍事援助的願望始終拒之門外；戰爭發展的形勢要求對中朝軍隊實行統一指揮，但金日成希望保留對朝鮮人民軍的指揮權，只是在蘇聯的干預下，朝鮮才交出了軍事指揮權；當中朝聯軍攻佔漢城以後，彭德懷要求部隊進行二至三個月的休整，而朝鮮領導人則堅持應繼續向南追擊，雙方發生嚴重爭吵，最後因史達林支援了中方而使問題得以解決；戰爭進入長期化狀態後，中朝雙方在鐵路運輸管理體制方面的矛盾開始激化，志願軍主張對鐵路實行軍事管制，並首先保證軍事物資供應，而朝方認為鐵路管理屬國家主權，應由朝鮮負責，並傾向於優先考慮經濟建設物資的運輸，結果還是史達林拍板，確定由中朝聯軍司令部對鐵路實行軍管；1952年下半年板門店停戰談判陷入僵局後，朝鮮主張接受美國的停戰條件，但北京和莫斯科從政治方面考慮，認為必須堅持強硬立場，金日成不得不再次接受現實。作者認為，韓戰期間中朝領導人之間的矛盾及其解決，反映了社會主義國家關係中一種內在的結構性失衡，即主權觀念與社會主義領導權之間的衝突，其結果決定了社會主義同盟固有的不穩定性。

　　　　　By using many newly available documents and memoirs, this article analyzes a little known but important episode in Sino-Northern Korean relations. By the time the United Nations troops crossed the 38th parallel, the North Korean leader had repeatedly refused direct military assistance from the PRC government. The development of the war demanded unifying the commanding authority of the Sino-Northern Korean army. However, Kim Il-Sung hoped to reserve the commanding authority of the Korean People's army to himself. It was only after the intervention by the Soviet Unionthat North Korea finally delegated military command. When the Sino-North Korean troops occupied Seoul, Peng Dehuai asked for a rest and reorganization of the troops for two or three months. However, the North-Korean leader insisted on moving southward. This caused a serious dispute that was solved only after Stalin supported the Chinese position. As the war dragged on, the conflicts between China and North Korea over the railroad administration system also began to intensify. The Chinese authorities proposed to put the railroad under military control and to give military supplies priority. But the North Korean authorities believed that the management of railroad belonged to the state and should be administrated by North Korea, which was inclined to emphasize the transportation of economic and construction goods over military supplies. Again, Stalin solved the dispute: the headquarters of the Sino-North Korean union troops implemented the military control of railroad. In the second half of 1952 the armistice negotiations of Panmunjom came to a deadlock. North Korea intended to accept the armistice conditions proposed by America. Due to political considerations, Beijing and Moscow insisted on a harder position. Again, Kim Il-Sung had to accept the position of China and Soviet Union. The conflicts between Chinese and North Korean leaders and their final resolutions thus reflected an inner structural imbalance within the relations of socialist countries—i.e., the conflict between the concepts of national sovereignty and socialist leadership, which ultimately determined the inherent instability within the socialist allies.