受到羅爾斯《正義論》之影響，當代論者對於社會正義的討論幾乎都以社會制度為對象。對羅爾斯及這些論者而言，社會制度是社會正義的場域。雖然這樣的理論進路看起來恨自然，但我們不應該因為強調社會制度，而忽視了制度賴以存在的社會條件，特別是社會的道德．習俗和風氣。合乎社會正義的制度，一旦建立，是否長可久，終究有賴於社會成為是否願意遵從制度對自己的要求，不僅如此，社會正義所要求的制度改革是否具有可行性，有時候也取決於社會成員是否願意調整自己的動機結構，而社會的道德．習俗和風氣對於個人的動機結構往往有決定性的影響。不幸地，羅爾斯的理論並沒有持非常制度性的社會條件足夠的重視。對羅爾斯而言，社會制度是否合乎主義，端視在現行的社會條件下，社會制度是否還有改善的空間，無需去封建我們是否可以透過調整某些社會條件，而讓不可行的改革成為可行。第一位指出羅爾斯的正義論犯了這種錯誤的是G. A Cohen 。本文基本上同意Cohen對維爾斯的批評。本文將指出，羅爾斯對個人的責任與社會的責任之合理劃分所提出的原則，使得他不能忽視社會道德、風氣和習俗。本文論證，一旦羅爾斯把社會的道德、風氣和習俗納入社會正義的納入社會正義的適用範圍內，擴大了社會正義的場城，那麼羅爾斯的差異原則 ( the Difference Principle ) 是否仍然具有合理性，或應該如何詮釋才具有合理性，將是一切新的問題。針對這個問題，木丈區別目的論式的詮釋的與合理契約式的詮釋，並且主張我們應該以使者來理解差異原則，才不至於讓差異原則導致全盤主義 (totalitarianism)。

Influenced by Rawls's A Theory of Justice, contemporary political philosophers devote themselves principally to social institutions in discussing social justice. Social institutions, so far as Rawls and these writers are concerned, are the site of social justice. Although it appears natural to take this approach, we should not overlook the social conditions­particularly social morality, conventions, and ethos-upon which social institutions are intrinsically dependent. In a community, once a system of social institutions in conformity with social justice is established, whether it can survive and last long would rely on whether its members are willing to follow what the system requires of them. And what is more, whether or not the reform demanded by social justice can be successfully implemented sometimes hinges upon the members' willingness to adjust their motivational sets, which are greatly susceptible to social morality, conventions, and ethos. Rawls's theory, unfortunately, puts very little emphasis on the non-institutional social conditions in question, since, on his view, to determine that a social system is just or unjust we only need to consider whether it still has room for improvement under the present social circumstances; there is no need to dwell on modifying certain social conditions so as to make certain arrangements feasible. In some of his recent works, G. A. Cohen points out the very problem of Rawls’s theory of justice. This essay is in basic agreement with Cohen's criticism of Rawls, and further contends that Rawls, endorsing a social division of responsibilities, ultimately cannot set aside the social morality, conventions, and ethos. In this essay 1 argue that if they are to be incorporated into the site of social justice, then whether Rawls's Difference Principle maintains its plausibility, or how it should be construed so as to remain plausible, is a new issue. This essay will distinguish between teleological and reasonable contractarian interpretation, and proposes that we understand the Difference Principle in light of the latter so that it prevents itself from being a form of totalitarianism.