本文首先說明如何理解平等與不平等之間貌似不相容的關係。除了平等自身的規範特性之外，由於平等還受正義理念所統籌，( 實現 ) 平等與 ( 容忍 )不平等因而得以一致地共存於正義理論內。透過掌握這項狀似矛盾的特殊屬性，我們能夠深刻地理解平等，正確持平地支持平等價值。而藉由分析此狀似矛盾之貌，本文也得以解釋平等與多元民主政治哲學或正義理論之間的兩重關係、：第一、平等與多元民主正義間狀似衝突之現象，乃符合實現多元民主之正義理念時所不可或缺之價值多樣性。第二、平等理念為多元民主正義論中不可化約、必然認可的政治理念；唯有將矛盾現象視為狀似，多元民主正義才可能。

This essay first aims to explain why “inequality” in equality is plausible and their seeming incompatibility is comprehensible. That the incompatibility is merely superficial, rather than genuine, is due to a normative character of equality and its role as one but no exclusive value among others in a conception of justice. After making explicit the characteristics of equality with a standpoint of apparent incompatibility, 1 demonstrate how this vantage point of view allows us to see more clearly the relationship between the demand of equality and a conception of justice for a pluralistic democracy in the following two ways. First, the apparent incompatibility between equality and a demand of pluralistic democracy fits the requirement of diversity of values in achieving a pluralistic democracy; second, since equality is an irreducible value in a conception of justice for a pluralistic democracy, such a conception is only possible when the incompatibility is apparent.