文獻指出經理人的薪酬主要取決於績效表現及其額外承擔風險的多寡，但以往國內研究多僅針對經理人薪酬與公司績效之關係進行探討，而對於公司經營風險與經理人薪酬的研究並不多見，因此本文檢視經理人薪酬與經營風險間的關係，並認為股東將補貼經理人額外承受的風險，另一方面，為要求經理人適度進行風險管理，薪酬將不會無限制上升，因此薪酬與非系統風險呈曲線關係，但與系統風險間的曲線關係則不會那麼明顯。我們以本國上市櫃公司為樣本，實證結果顯示，股東會補貼經理人承擔的風險，而且經理人的薪酬與非系統風險間呈曲線關係，而與系統風險間，則沒有發現上述的曲線關係。

The paper examines the relationship between executive compensation and firm risk. We argue stockholders will compensate the risk that managers undertake. In addition, to encourage proper risk management, compensation will not increase unlimitedly. Instead, we argue that the relationship between compensation and unsystematic risk is curvature. However, the curvature relation between compensation and systematic risk is less evident since risk management is less efficient in dealing with undiversifiable risk.