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題名:總經理減薪效應、盈餘管理與家族控制型企業之研究
作者:黃麗津
作者(外文):Li-Jin Huang
校院名稱:國立東華大學
系所名稱:企業管理學系
指導教授:林穎芬
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2015
主題關鍵詞:總經理個人減薪效應家族控制型企業盈餘管理CEO Pay CutsEarning ManagementFamily Firm
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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高階管理者薪酬一直是代理問題的焦點。本文有別於過去的研究,從總經理個人薪酬的角度探討績效-薪酬之關聯性,以及企業的公司治理機制(如獨立董事比例,董事會規模,總經理雙重性,外部大股東與機構投資人持股比率)所產生之效益。且基於家族控制型企業經營特性與非家族控制型企業的不同,進一步探究不同組織結構下(家族與非家族),總經理個人減薪效應之差異。配合台灣對薪酬揭露之規定,研究期間為1999-2004年。實證結果顯示,前期績效不佳將導致總經理個人被減薪且減薪幅度可能超過25%以上,且在公司治理機制較為良好時,總經理因績效不佳而被減薪的情況也較多。再者,當總經理個人被減薪後,績效確實會有所回升。而家族控制型企業相較於非家族控制型企業,減薪情況較多但金額較小,且於減薪後會有績效回復的情況。最後,家族控制型企業在總經理個人減薪後的績效改善,並非採行盈餘管理行為而來,證實家族控制型企業較符合管家理論。
Executive compensation is the focus of agency problems. This study examines the relationship between individual CEO compensation and company performance. Moreover, we discuss whether poor performance - CEO pay cut would be influenced by the CG (e.g., the proportion of independent directors, board size, outside blockholder, CEO duality, and institutional holdings). Besides, This paper observes the difference in individual CEO pay cut is based on the different Organizational Structure (family business and non-family business). According to related regulations in Taiwan, the analysis of this research is based on 1999-2004 data. Our empirical evidence reveals that poor company performance will lead to over 25% reduced compensation of individual CEO, and the higher the CG, the more CEO pay cut. We also find out company performance will become better (rebound) after single CEO compensation is cut down. Furthermore, our findings show there is more CEO small pay cut in family business than non-family business. Finally, based on the stewardship theory, the non-existence of earnings management behavior between CEO pay cut and performance improvement in the family business.
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