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題名：員工分紅配股與公司經營績效
作者：游淑禎
作者(外文)：Shwu-Jen You
校院名稱：雲林科技大學
系所名稱：管理研究所博士班
指導教授：傅鍾仁
吳欽杉
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2003
主題關鍵詞：員工分紅入股制度；最適獎酬契約；經營績效；Firm performance；Compensation contract；Employee stock bonus plans
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提供給員工權益性質的獎酬(equity-based compensation)，可讓員工與股東的利益趨於一致，為解決誘因不足的一種激勵機制。尤其在新經濟浪潮下，許多企業大量運用權益性質的獎酬以吸引並留住人才。美國企業所使用的權益獎酬主要是認股選擇權，台灣則獨創員工分紅入股制度，幾乎所有高科技公司都採行了此人才激勵制度，論者並將台灣高科技產業的競爭力歸功於此誘因制度。鑑於以往研究較少以理論模型分析員工分紅入股制度與公司經營績效之關聯性，本論文先以理論模型探討員工分紅入股制度對經營績效之影響，而後以台灣地區上市公司資料進行實證分析。
理論分析顯示，當獎酬契約涵蓋較充分的績效資訊時，可提供給員工較多的誘因，從而提升公司經營績效。具體而言，納入財務面與市場面績效指標的獎酬契約優於只納入財務面績效指標的獎酬契約，可創造較多的股東財富。理論分析進一步顯示，當獎酬契約未涵蓋市場面績效指標時，則實施員工分紅配股可提供增額誘因，以增加股東財富。相反的，當獎酬契約已涵蓋市場面績效指標時，則實施員工分紅配股無法進一步激勵員工，股東財富未見增加。換言之，員工分紅配股與市場面指標成替代關係。
然而，員工分紅配股制度固然具有誘因效果，卻也同時引發兩種額外成本，其中一種成本源於員工的風險規避態度，另一種則來自分紅配股後所產升的盈餘稀釋問題。因此，理論分析部分亦探討考量誘因效果與成本效果下的最適分紅配股契約。在最適分紅配股率的契約下，淨誘因效果得以極大化。反之，當分紅配股率高於最適水準時，淨誘因效果開始減少。而若配股率高於所導出的最大分紅配股水準，則淨誘因效果為負，實施員工分紅配股反而減損股東財富。另外，比較靜態分析顯示，最適分紅配股率與市場面指標雜訊成反向關係，而與財務面指標雜訊成正向關係。
實證部分以1991-2001年期間有實施員工分紅配股制度的台灣地區上市公司為樣本，比較其實施前與實施後之經營績效，結果顯示，樣本公司實施員工分紅配股制度後，其財務績效與股東財富皆顯著增加。另外，理論分析所預期之分紅配股率與財務面指標雜訊成正向關係，亦獲得支持。但分紅配股率與市場面指標雜訊成反向關係之預期，則未獲得支持。
Equity-based compensation provides employees a direct interest in the performance of the firm that extends beyond employment considerations. Research examining the relationship between compensation contracts and firm performance is premised on the assumption that compensation scheme can be structured to align employees’ interests with those of the shareholders. Equity-based compensation is the primary tool to achieve this balance. Employee stock bonus plans (ESBPs) are widely used by firms in Taiwan to motivate employees toward improving corporate performance. By exploring the role of ESBPs in compensation contracts, this paper analyzes theoretically and empirically the relationship between ESBPs and firm performance.
Based on a standard agency model, the theoretical analysis indicates that stockholders’ expected wealth is higher when the compensation contract is designed on the basis of a relatively more complete set of information, including market and financial measures of performance than when it is based on only financial measure. The analysis also shows that stock bonus plans act as a substitute for market measure of performance. The adoption of ESBPs can increase shareholders’ wealth only when market performance measure is not incorporated in the incentive scheme.
Although the usage of equity-based compensation can provide incentive, there are costs involved. The finding of an optimal amount of stock bonus explicitly deals with the trade-off between incentive-alignment benefits and value-decreasing costs. When the amount of stock bonus granted is optimal, the net incentive effect is maximized. In contrast, the derived maximal level of stock bonus indicates that when the level of stock grants is beyond the stopping point, the negative effect overrides the incentive effect. The analysis of comparative statics further reveals that the optimal level is decreasing in the noise of market performance measure and increasing in the noise of financial performance measure.
Empirical analysis with a sample of publicly listed nonfinancial firms in Taiwan reveals that the financial performance and outside shareholders’ wealth enhance after ESBPs are implemented. Further analysis provides evidence consistent with the theoretical prediction that the ratio of stock bonus awards is positively related to noise in the financial performance measure. But the predicted negative association between the ratio of stock bonus awards and noise in the market measure is not sustained.
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