年金改革是二十世紀末期以來許多國家重要的社會安全工程。這一波全球的年金改革的特色之一，是出現區域聚合的傾向。西歐和北歐地區、中歐和東歐地區、以及拉丁美洲地區等，這些地區內的許多國家，不僅其年金改革的時間相近，其年金改革的策略類似。相對於歐洲福利先進國家的改革受既有制度架構之制約而限制了改革的選項，拉丁美洲以及中歐與東歐各國年金改革，則出現許多結構性的變革。在我國老年所得保障體系面臨結構性改革壓力之際，拉丁美洲和歐洲轉型國家的年金改革經驗，有許多值得國內深入探討與省思之處。本文發現，拉丁美洲和歐洲轉型國家這一波的年金改革，具有不同的改革策略和內涵。整體而言，拉丁美洲各國的年金改革，是採取以新制度取代舊制度的「替代型」改革居多；而歐洲轉型國家的年金改革則是以新、舊兩種制度並存的「雙重型」最為普遍。各國年金改革模式的差異，相當程度是受其國內政治與財經環境的影響。既有年金方案的財務狀況、政府對年金改革財務成本的負荷能力、勞工團體和年金受益者團體的壓力、政治要角推動結構性年金改革的決心、以及政治現實下的適度妥協等，都影響著這些國家年金改革的幅度與方向。反觀我國年金制度的建構，既有的老人津貼體系已造成政府沈重的財務壓力，卻無法像上述國家一樣，將此壓力轉換成推動制度改革的動力。經過這些年來的規劃與反覆地討論，行政部門對於我國未來年金體系的建構，早有清晰的方向。未來制度改革的成敗，應是繫於行政部門溝通協調的努力，與推動制度改革的決心。

Many countries have engineered pension reform since the twentieth century was drawing to its end. This wave of global pension reform shows a tendency of regional cluster, that is, countries in the same region tend to embark on pension reform at about the same time and employ similar strategies for reform. Whereas in Western advanced welfare regimes the range of pension reform has generally been limited by their existent institutional structures; by contrast, some countries in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe have witnessed structural changes in their pension reforms. As we are at this juncture in Taiwan pressed to reform the structure of our old-age income protection system, the experiences of those countries in Latin America and Europe which have undergone “radical pension reform” should well deserve our investigation and reflections in some depth, if we are to institute a good National Pension System. Our analysis in this paper shows that countries in Latin America, on one hand, and those in Central and Eastern Europe, on the other, have employed different strategies for pension reform. Countries in Latin America have often adopted a “substitute” strategy, with the old system being replaced by the new one. On the other hand, countries in Central and Eastern Europe have more generally employed a “parallel” strategy, with the old and the new schemes both in operation simultaneously. The variations in the pension reform strategies reflect substantially the differences in domestic political and economic situations of these countries. Specifically, the financial situation of the pre-existing pension schemes, government's capacity to sustain the financial burden of the pension reform, the pressure from labor and pensioner groups, the determination of vital political actors to advance structural pension reforms, and the compromises necessitated by realpolitik: all these bear upon the scope and orientation of pension reform in these countries. The old-age allowance system in Taiwan has placed a severe financial burden on the government, and yet, unlike those countries mentioned above, the financial crisis has not become a dynamic force for institutional reform. As a consequence of the intensive discussions and planning carried out in these years, the government has gained a clear picture of what the pension system should be restructured in the future. The key to successful pension reform in Taiwan hinges on the drive and determination of our political actors.