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題名:不同拍賣機制對不良資產價格之影響
書刊名:中山管理評論
作者:彭芳琪張金鶚 引用關係陳明吉 引用關係
作者(外文):Peng, Fang-chiChang, Chin-ohChen, Ming-chi
出版日期:2008
卷期:16:3
頁次:頁401-428
主題關鍵詞:不良資產拍賣機制拍賣底價拍賣效率Non-performing assetsAuction mechanismFloor pricesAuction efficiency
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(3) 博士論文(2) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:3
  • 共同引用共同引用:75
  • 點閱點閱:52
目前國內不動產市場的法拍與銀拍屋分屬第一價位密封投標拍賣以及英式拍賣制度,不同於國外不動產拍賣主要是以正常資產為標的,國內的標的乃是不良債權不動產抵押品,不僅產品本質較特殊,其處分也因受到法令限制使得市場結構及訂價制度與國外不同。因此本文希望能瞭解國內不良資產在不同拍賣制度下拍定價格的差異性、底價制度差異對於拍賣結果的影響,以及不同拍賣機制對於處分不良資產的效率表現。研究發現兩市場底價訂定的差異是造成銀拍屋市場拍定價低於法拍屋的主因。當校估兩市場底價至同一水準後,可發現銀拍屋拍定價格實較法拍屋溢價2.83%,而兩者間價差有限則是由於競爭程度不足,使得銀拍屋的競價功能未完全發揮以及法拍屋市場存在買方訊息不對稱所致。此外實證也發現銀拍屋市場能有效的降低訊息不對稱的現象,是一較有效率的拍賣機制。
The real estate market in Taiwan implements two types of auction. The court auction uses the first price sealed-bid, whereas the bank auction applies the open-outcry bidding. Taiwan real estate auction is unique in the world because its objects are non-performing assets and its operation is bound by laws. This study tried to investigate the differences of auction prices, floor prices and operation efficiencies between the court and bank auction markets in Taiwan. Our empirical results suggest that discrepancy in price setting is the major cause for the fact that bank auction price is lower than court auction price. However, when the floor prices for these two markets are adjusted to the same level, the bank auction price is 2.83% higher than the court auction price. The small discrepancy in the auction price might be due to a low competition in the bank auction market and information asymmetry among buyers. We also found that the bank auction is more efficient to clear non-performing assets.
期刊論文
1.Quan, D. C.(2002)。Market Mechanism Choice and Real Estate Disposition: Search vs Auction。Real Estate Economics,30(3),365-384。  new window
2.Milgrom, Paul R.、Weber, Robert J.(1982)。A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding。Econometrica,50(5),1089-1122。  new window
3.Rosen, S.(1974)。Hedonic Price and Implicit Market: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition。Journal of Political Economy,32(1),34-55。  new window
4.Vickrey, William(1961)。Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders。The Journal of Finance,16(1),8-37。  new window
5.林秋瑾、楊宗憲、張金鶚(19960100)。住宅價格指數之研究--以臺北市為例。住宅學報,4,1-30。new window  延伸查詢new window
6.林祖嘉(19940600)。價格分散與搜尋均衡在臺灣地區住宅市場上之驗證。經濟論文叢刊,22(2),237-267。new window  延伸查詢new window
7.林祖嘉(19920300)。臺灣地區房租與房價關係之研究。臺灣銀行季刊,43(1),279-312。new window  延伸查詢new window
8.Lusht, K. M.(1996)。A Comparison of Prices Brought by English Auctions and Private Negotiations。Real Estate Economics,24(4),12-130。  new window
9.Mayer, C. J.(1998)。Assessing the Performance of Real Estate Auction。Journal of Real Estate Economics,26(1),41-66。  new window
10.Ivanova-Stenzel, R.、Salmon, T. C.(2004)。Bidder Preference among Auction Institutions。Economic Inquiry,42(2),223-236。  new window
11.Cramton, P.(1998)。Applications of Auction Theory - Ascending Auction。European Economic Review,42(3-5),745-756。  new window
12.McAfee, R. P.、Quan, D. C.、Vincent, D. R.(2000)。How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids, with an Application to Real Estate Auctions。Journal of Industrial Economics,55(4),391-416。  new window
13.Kagel, J. H.、Levin, D.(1999)。Common Value Auctions with Insider Information。Econometrica,67(5),1219-1238。  new window
14.Quan, D. C.(1994)。Real Estate Auction: A Survey of Theory and Practice。Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,9(1),23-49。  new window
會議論文
1.陳憶茹、張金鶚(2004)。法拍屋市場結構與價格之分析。0。608-620。  延伸查詢new window
2.蔡芬蓮、張金鶚(1997)。法拍屋價格影響因素之研究-以臺北市為例。0。613-641。  延伸查詢new window
3.林育聖、張金鶚(2004)。建商訂價行為之研究。0。251-263。  延伸查詢new window
研究報告
1.張金鶚(1995)。台灣地區住宅價格指數之研究。  延伸查詢new window
學位論文
1.李月華(2000)。台北市住宅價格模式之研究(博士論文)。淡江大學。new window  延伸查詢new window
圖書
1.Krishna, V.(2002)。Auction Theory。New York, NY:Elsevier Science。  new window
 
 
 
 
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